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NON-TAX ADVANTAGES OF THE REVOCABLE TRUST
(WITH EMPHASIS ON USE AS WILL SUBSTITUTE)
By MILTON E. MEYER, JR.*
(in collaboration with Hayes R. Hindry)
There are no important tax advantages associated with the re-
vocable trust.' However, it is important to stress that there are no
tax disadvantages connected with this legal form of temporarily or
(if death intercedes) permanently disposing of property. Stated an-
other way, where the living trust is intended to be used in whole or
in part as a will substitute, all the estate and income tax savings
that can flow from one or more skillfully drawn testamentary trusts
(including full use of the estate tax marital deduction) are equally
available from a skillfully drawn revocable trust.
2
This article will be devoted to a discussion of the non-tax ad-
vantages of the revocable trust-particularly those advantages that
arise from the legal fact that the corpus of a properly drawn re-
vocable trust escapes the rigors of probate upon the death of the
grantor. It will be presumed that the reader has a basic familiarity
with the legal concept of trusts and general principles of estate
planning. The trusts we will deal with will have the common de-
nominator of revocability-which includes, of course, the retained
right in the grantor (or someone else) to alter or amend the terms
of the trust and to add or withdraw assets from the trust corpus.
Authors of estate planning treatises typically give brief but
favorable mention to the revocable trust (frequently referred to as
the "revocable living trust" 3) and allude to its ever increasing use.
However, comment on the device is generally limited to a terse
summary of commonly conceded advantages, with only passing ref-
erence to what, in this writer's opinion, is the greatest advantage of-
fered-the economic advantage that can result from the legal avoid-
ance of probate administration.
I. AN ENUMERATION OF ADVANTAGES
The advantages usually cited for the living trust include the
following:
1. Affords a Preview of Post-Death Administration. By setting
up the trust in his lifetime, the grantor is in a position to observe
the facility with which his trustee accomplishes the objectives of
the trust, making necessary changes in the trusteeship or the pro-
visions of the trust as may be warranted.
2. Affords a Useful Substitute for an Agency Relationship or a
Potential Conservatorship. If a person travels frequently or exten-
*Mr. Meyer is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and a member of the Denver
firm of Hindry, Erickson and Meyer. His article is based on a 1960 address given to registrants of the
course "Practical Problems in Estate Planning and Family Tax Planning" offered by the University of
Denver College of Law.
1 Income of the revocable trust continues to be taxed to the grantor: Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
676. Nothing is removed from the estate for federal estate tax purposes: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038.
Similar results pertain under most state taxing laws. See, however, comment at note 27, infra.
2 Because of the revocability of the transfer into trust, no gift tax liability is incurred. Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
3 To distinguish this form of trust from the testamentary trust which comes into existence after
death, under the provisions of a will.
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sively, or is called into military service, it may be necessary for him
to entrust the handling of his investments or business affairs to an-
other. An agency relationship suffers from its vulnerability to sud-
den legal termination by reason of the death or legal incapacity of
the principal. The problem is especially acute when the principal
is not heard from for protracted periods and might be dead (as dur-
ing war time) or is the subject of a mysterious disappearance. At a
time when the necessity for the functioning of an agent might be
the greatest, the power of the agent to act might cease to exist or,
at the very least, be uncertain. All these difficulties can be pre-
vented by the intelligent use of a living trust in lieu of the agency
technique.
A similar sophisticated use of the revocable trust is available
to a person of advanced age or poor health who is realistic enough
to recognize that the continued passage of time might result in a
gradual impairment of faculties and judgment (whether or not suf-
ficient eventually to justify legal adjudication of incompetency)
that renders him unable to handle his own affairs with safety. The
living trust offers a non-public and highly flexible solution to this
potential problem and ought probably to be urged by members of
the family where there is foreseeable danger that such a person may
slip into that twilight zone where competency regresses but adjudi-
cation is either unwarranted or undesired. The properly drawn
trust, of course, not only provides for the grantor during the bal-
ance of his life, but makes disposition of the trust property for the
benefit of his family at his death. By keeping such a trust revoc-
able, psychological hazards are frequently avoided. Furthermore,
an irrevocable trust for the support of a grantor would lack the in-
come and estate tax advantages normally associated with this legal
form .
4
3. Affords (Within Limits) a Choice of Applicable State Law.
Although not free from doubt5 it seems fairly clear that the grantor
of a revocable living trust (particularly as to that portion of the
corpus which is personalty) can specify that the law of a state other
than his domicile shall govern all matters of administration and in-
terpretation of the trust. It is clear, for example, that residents of
New York State (where more restrictive rules as to trust accumula-
tions and perpetuities have pertained in the past) have avo'ded these
restrictions by setting up trusts in New Jersey or some other state
of their choice, utilizing trustees domiciled in such other states, and
specifying that the law of such other states shall govern. Whether
one can avoid the property laws of his own jurisdication by taking
lesser steps than suggested above is a highly technical question in-
volving conflict of laws principles and is beyond the scope of this
paper.
4. Affords Less Vulnerability to Attack by Disgruntled Heirs.
Because a properly drawn and executed revocable trust will, as a
4 Where income of an irrevocable trust is reserved b the grantor, he not only remains taxable
with respect to such income, but the corpus will be includ d in his estate: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
2036.5 See Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook, Chapter IX (1951).
SACHS-ULAULOR- [ORPORATIOHl SEALS- ALPInE S-3422
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matter of law, escape probate in virtually all jurisdictions, the op-
portunity for successful attack by disgruntled parties is substantially
lessened. Probate procedure in most jurisdictions literally invites
all comers to attack the validity of a will, and the highly technical
requirements of testamentary disposition frequently provide the op-
portunity for successful attack. Quite the contrary is true with re-
spect to circumstances surrounding the living trust. Requirements
for execution are simple (normally the attested signature of the
grantor is sufficient; formal acceptance by the trustee is seldom a
prerequisite to a valid trust). If the trust has been in existence for
a period of time prior to the grantor's death, there is a fait accompli
aspect to the trust that discourages attack at his later death. Fur-
thermore, the privacy of the trust (commented on later) and the
absence of notice requirements can result in a situation where the
dissident element may not even be advised of the grantor's death
until long after its occurrence.
As will be emphasized at another place, the very advantages
discussed under this heading put a grave responsibility on the
draftsman of a living trust to discourage the use of the device where
the grantor's intent is to prevent his wife, creditors or others nor-
mally protected by law from an effective assertion of their rightful
claims.
5. Affords Continuity of Investment Management and Flow of
Income. Every lawyer is familiar with the delays and problems
that can attend the administration of a decedent's estate-assets
must be located and marshalled, the interest or lack of interest of
the decedent in a piece of property must be verified, heirs and bene-
ficiaries must be located and served with various formal notices and
given their opportunities to interpose objections. If the legal rep-
resentative and his lawyer have no particular prior familiarity with
the extent and nature of the property interests or the identity and
whereabouts of interested parties, the problems become especially
acute. Meanwhile, a widow and perhaps minor children have to be
supported; a business, possibly, must somehow be run or, more
likely, ground to an orderly halt. It is of necessity a time for con-
serving, liquidating, refraining from taking any investment action,
however potentially rewarding. At best, it is a time of uncertainty
and anxiety for the family of the deceased; at worst, it is downright
chaotic, with real financial hardship (or, equally bad, the fear of it)
affecting the family.
A properly drawn living trust can go a long way towards solv-
ing the above-described problems. In the first place, the grantor
has had to take a good look at his assets (or at least some of them)
at the time he placed them in the trust-widely scattered assets are
likely to have been assembled; assets requiring some attention have
probably received it. In any event, someone besides himself (name-
ly, his trustee or trustees) has been inserted into the picture during
his lifetime-an opportunity an executor or administrator rarely
gets. Secondly, while the grantor may, if he chooses, continue as the
dominant party in his trust arrangement for the balance of his life,
controlling investment policy and asset management and deriving
chief benefit from the trust income, the machinery has been set up
to provide a continuity of asset management at his death and an
DICTA
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immediate shift of income flow from himself to other members of
his family. An active business that may constitute an asset of the
trust has a better opportunity, perhaps, of continued existence for
the benefit of the family than if subject to probate; investment op-
portunities norma]ly not available to or availed of by an executor or
administrator can be taken advantage of by the trustees if the trust
provisions so permit; improper or deteriorating investments can be
disposed of promptly without the necessary procedural delays at-
tendant upon probate that may aggravate losses.
6. Affords Greater Privacy. For persons who crave privacy, the
living trust performs another valuable function. Unlike the probate
file, which is a public record containing a copy of the will, asset in-
ventories, schedule of debts, and the like, the trust file is completely
private. While disclosure of assets and liabilities must be made to
taxing authorities by trustees as well as executors, appropriate laws
normally prevent dissemination of this information. If there are
probated assets in addition to trust assets, it is true that, under the
law of most states, a copy of the inheritance tax return (listing all
assets) may eventually have to be filed in the probate file. How-
ever, this is generally long after public curiosity occasioned by the
death has diminished.
Sometimes probate file disclosures about a business interest
which is part of a probate estate have given aid and comfort to com-
petitors or resulted in a reduction in the value realized on liquida-
tion. These hazards can generally be avoided where the interest is
part of a living trust.
7. Affords Substantial Immunity from Creditors and Other
Claimants. While morally a less defensible reason for consider-
ing use of the revocable living trust, it is true that, under the laws
of most states, the grantor can preserve his assets from attack by
creditors or others ordinarily having rights against his assets by
placing them in such a trust. While normally attaching only after
the grantor's death, there is reason to believe that limited immunity
from creditors can apply in some jurisdictions even before the
grantor's death.!
Of interest to Colorado lawyers is the fairly recent Von Brecht
case in which the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
living trust against the claim of a surviving wife where the grantor
established the trust with respect to substantially all his property
six years before his marriage.7
8. Affords Opportunity for Substantial Economic Savings. In
the judgment of the writer, this can be by far the most spectacular
of all the advantages of using the revocable living trust. The bal-
ance of this paper will be devoted to demonstrating how this can
be so and in making practical suggestions concerning the achieve-
ment of these savings. Since the magnitude of these savings is in
direct relationship to the amount of property successfully placed
6 Id. at 74, 91-94, 97.
7 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958). The court commented with
apparent favor on the earlier Colorado case of Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953) as
follows: "The trust in that case waslupheld as against a plaintiff who was the wife of the setflor at
the time it wastcreated. Here the trust was set up and in full operation for six years before the settlor
married the lady who now seeks to invalidate the agreement." (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing is
quoted verbatim because of factual differences between the transactions in the Thuet and Von Brecht
cases.
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in a trust of this kind, this paper will emphasize the desirability of
placing most of one's property in the trust-all, if possible. This is
one place where, if a little bit is good, a lot is even better.
II. USE OF TRUST As A WILL SUBSTITUTE
Undoubtedly there are still lawyers who shudder at any open
reference to the use of the revocable living trust as a will substitute.
However, since the Von Brecht case, previously alluded to, there
would appear to be no valid reason in Colorado to fear that an ex-
pressed intention to utilize a revocable living trust in place of a will
to accomplish an ultimate disposition of property will cause the ef-
fort to be struck down as an attempted testamentary disposition
that fails to satisfy the technical requirements of a will. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court said in that case:
Where, as here, the property involved in a trust is as-
signed, transferred and set over to the trustee and remains
in the name of the trustee, the interest of the settlor therein
passes to the trustee in presenti and while the settlor re-
mains alive the transfer is inter vivos and not testamentary.
Hence, if an owner of property can dispose of it inter vivos
and thereby render a will unnecessary for accomplishment
of his practical purposes, he has a right to do so. The mo-
tive in making such a transfer may be to obtain the practi-
cal advantages of a will without the necessity of making
one, but the motive is immaterial. (emphasis supplied) s
With this judicial "green light" smoothing over any legal ob-
stacles to the use of the living trust in Colorado, what is the mea-
sure of the potential economic savings? Are we talking about
enough in dollars to warrant the use of a non-familiar pattern of
doing things? Where do the savings actually arise? Are there not
other substantial costs incurred in the use of the living trust so that
the hoped for savings are less than claimed? Does not the grantor
lose substantial control over his property? These are some of the
questions we will now endeavor to answer.
An example will be helpful. If a Denver resident dies, leaving
a probate estate of $250,000, his estate will incur an executor's fee
of $9,0001 (if the executor claims the full statutory fee allowable)
and attorney's fees of $10,30010 (if the lawyer claims no more than
8 Id. at 99, 322 P.2d at 672.
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-14-16 (Supp. 1957).
10 The Minimum Fee Schedule adopted by The Denver Bar Association on March 12, 1958 reads in
part as follows:
"Estates
A. Minimum Charge-regardless of inventory . ................ ................... $150.00
B. Percentages based on gross value of property and assets in-
ventoried in County Court (these percentages do 'not include
services rendered in connection with insurance, joint tenancies,
and other property or assets not included in inventory) ---------- 6% of gross to $5,000
5% of next $20,000
4% of next $225,000
3% of next $250,000
No recommendation for
balance of fee on estates
C. Percentage based on all property and assets not inventoried in exceeding $500,000
the County Court, which require the preparation of legal in-
struments, state or federal inheritance tax returns (including
particularly all assets and property in joint tenancy, and all




the "minimum" fee prescribed by the Denver Bar Association)."
By tradition and custom (and probably by law) in Colorado, as well
as in virtually all other jurisdictions, an attorney is always em-
ployed to represent the executor or administrator during probate
where the fiduciary is a non-lawyer or trust company. Normally
this is the attorney who prepared the will, if a will is probated, and
this practice is rather uniformly adhered to around the country.
There will also be various other administrative costs incurred.
Tables have been prepared which estimate total administrative costs
for various sizes of estates on a national average basis.12 These ex-
penses, of course, are in addition to federal estate tax and state
inheritance taxes, which apply in any case where the estate is large
enough, whether or not a will is used.
Illustrating the savings is the actual case of an elderly Denver
resident who, resisting persuasive efforts favoring the living trust,
insisted that the writer prepare for him a will containing a testa-
mentary trust for his family. Such a will was executed by him
early in December of 1958. A week later he decided he wanted the
living trust instead. One was prepared for him which achieved the
same family objectives and tax savings as his will had. This was
executed on December 31, 1958. He died ten months later leaving
a taxable estate of over $400,000, slightly less than one-half of which
was in joint tenancy with his wife with the remainder being in his
living trust. Not one item of property had to be probated. Although
the jointly held property would not, of course, have been probated
in any event, the consequent savings to his family resulting from
his decision to utilize the living trust still amounted to almost
$17,000 net.'
3
11 It will be of interest to Colorado lawyers that the attorney's fee for handling a $250,000 probate
estate in Denver is $2,550 more than for the some estate in Chicago and $2,875 more than the some
estate in Milwaukee (see report of Survey of Bar Association Schedules prepared by a special Com-
mittee of American Bar Association appearing in 98 Trusts and Estates, 1012-14 (1959).
It is of further interest to compare the figure of $10,300 (the attorney's fee for a probate estate of
$250,000 in Denver) with the fees for the some size estate in 15 other states having statutory or state-
wide Bar Association fee schedules, as summarized in 99 Trusts and Estates 719-21 (1960). The average
of such fees in these 15 states is approximately $7,350.
12 The following are excerpts from "Tax Planning Tables" published by Institute for Business
Planning, Inc.:
Probate and Administration







13 In Denver the jointly held property attracts an attorney's fee of 1/0 under the minimum fee
schedule.
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In a similar case familiar to the writer, where the grantor died
just five months after replacing his will with a living trust which
contained his entire estate of some $450,000, the savings to his family
exceeded $25,000 net.
If all this is true, why is the living trust not more frequently
used? Why is it that many persons of property are not even aware
of the living trust as a total or partial alternative to the use of a
will?
A well-known authority on estate planning stated in one of his
better known works:
The [revocable living trust] device would be used even
more, in the author's opinion, if it were not for overzealous
preoccupation among businessmen (and to a dangerously
large degree among lawyers) with prospective tax sav-
ings.
14
While the above observation of the distinguished writer is pos-
sibly correct, it is this writer's view that only the New England
restraint of the quoted authority prevented him from citing addi-
tional reasons in explaining why the device is not more frequently
used. For example, it is the present writer's belief that more im-
portant reasons for the infrequency with which the living trust is
used as a total or partial will substitute would have to include the
following:
(1) Unfamiliarity with the potentialities of the living
trust on the part of many attorneys and financial advisors.
(2) An unwillingness on the part of some clients, even
after adequate explanation, to depart from patterns they
consider familiar.
(3) An "overzealous preoccupation" (to borrow from
the passage quoted above) among some lawyers and some
representatives of corporate fiduciaries with the perpetua-
tion of the application to decedents' estates of tradition-
hallowed, time-honored, but overly-protective and elaborate
judicial machinery, which application has the incidental ef-
fect of providing very handsome legal and executor's fees
for the same lawyers and corporate fiduciaries for work
that frequently is quite routine, if time consuming, in na-
ture.
The point last made will be vehemently denied by many at-
torneys and trust officers. A number of "legal" arguments will be
brought to bear for the purpose of demonstrating the dignity of and
necessity for the formal administration of decedents' estates. There
will, perhaps, even be vague references to "illegality," "sham,"
"fraud" and the like directed at efforts to by-pass probate through
use of the living trust.
Nevertheless, the late Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, in his
well-known and scholarly work on the law of wills, 1 5 states ". . . in
more than half of the cases in which people leave some property, it
has been found possible to avoid administration."' 6 After citing the
expense, delays and inconvenience of administration as being the
14 Shattuck, supra note 4, at 76.
15 Atkinson, Wills (2d ed. 1953).
16 Id. at 566.
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causes for attempts to dispense with probate, he continues "The
popular demand for reform in the latter field [probate court pro-
cedure] is largely inarticulate, but is nonetheless real as shown by
the efforts to shun the probate courts. Yet one who seeks to find
a solution to the problems of dispensing with or shortening the ad-
ministration of decedents' estates is literally a voice crying in the
wilderness." 17 Possibly the third point stated above suggests a rea-
son why this is so.
Probate procedure has its origin in the English ecclesiastical
courts of several centuries ago. As modified in both England and
America, it has served a vital need in protecting the property of a
deceased for his beneficiaries and creditors and against marauders
and unscrupulous debtors. This was accomplished essentially
through the extraordinary police and coercive powers of the judicial
tribunal, however ponderous and complex.
In the last several decades, however, the economic and sociologi-
cal development of this country has produced a number of refine-
ments in the techniques of property ownership, property transfer
and debtor-creditor relationships that have made unnecessary in
most cases resort to the courts for the enforcement of rights. For
example, recording statutes, rules and regulations of stock transfer
agents, the regulations surrounding ownership of United States Sav-
ings Bonds and other registered evidences of indebtedness, rules
relating to the protection of depositors in commercial and savings
banks, the extent to which commerce is carried on through checks,
drafts, notes and other highly regulated secured and unsecured
credit transactions without recourse to cash and other bearer forms
of wealth, the popularity of safety deposit boxes with their techni-
cal rules regarding access, and the extensive use and development
of the various forms of life insurance contracts. All these have mini-
mized the danger of unauthorized persons making off with the de-
ceased's assets, leaving family and creditors high and dry. A large
part of the function of the probate court has therefore been filled
by other, less cumbersome, means without, however, depriving ag-
grieved parties of recourse to the courts. The chief remaining func-
tions-the satisfaction of creditors of the deceased (including taxing
authorities) and the orderly passage of title to the designated bene-
ficiaries of the deceased can certainly be accomplished without the
necessity of formal administration.
One is certainly free to question the need for the more costly,
complex and dilatory processes of probate administration, if a re-
vocable living trust can accomplish, as to all or some part of a per-
son's estate, the following things:
1. Complete freedom to alter the distributive pattern right up
to the moment of death or incapacity.
2. Instantaneous transfer of assets from decedent's control to
that of his chosen beneficiaries (or to trusts for their benefit and
protection).
3. Titles as indefeasibly vested as if they had been processed
through probate.
4. Immediate availability of income for decedent's beneficiaries.
17 Id. at 575.
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5. All the estate tax and inheritance tax minimization that can
be accomplished through a well-drawn will.
6. Full protection for decedent's creditors and the various tax
collectors.
7. Preservation of the rights of aggrieved heirs and others in-
terested in the estate to test their claims against the estate in court.
8. Elimination of or substantial reduction in administration ex-
penses that range from 5% to 10% of the value of the estate.
9. The securing of all the other advantages listed at the outset
of this article.
10. The accomplishment of all the foregoing without interfer-
ence with decedent's enjoyment of his property prior to his death.
The writer's experience is that the properly drawn revocable
living trust can and does accomplish the above-stated objectives in
a most satisfactory manner.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to a discussion of
a few of the techniques and practices that can be employed by the
draftsman of a revocable living trust to insure the accomplishment
of these objectives. It will also deal with the questions, raised ear-
lier, of whether the cost of using the living trust form substantially
reduces the hoped for savings and whether the grantor must divest
himself of all real control over his assets.
III. TECHNIQUES IN DRAFTING AND ADMINISTRATION
A. The Matter of Costs.
Even though a client believes (or takes on faith) that the re-
vocable living trust will accomplish the various objectives detailed
in Part II (most of which cannot be achieved until at or after his
death), he is not generally interested in going further unless he can
also be persuaded that he can live with (1) the cost in dollars of (a)
getting the program into operation (expenses of drafting and re-
lated legal services, transfer fees, etc.) and (b) continuing the pro-
gram during the balance of his life; and (2) the cost in reduced
control over his assets resulting from the immediate legal effective-
ness of the trust. Future benefits are fine, but they are never as
real as the current detriments incurred in achieving them.
The question of the legal fee for drafting and related services
must, in the judgment of the writer, be forthrightly dealt with. The
investigative and fact-finding activity of the attorney must be ex-
tensive because he must take specific action with respect to each of
attorneys who want service
consistently select
for publication of legal notices
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the client's assets. However, the determination of family objectives
and the applications to them of tax minimizing procedures is no
more and no less than that involved in traditional forms of estate
analysis and planning; the drafting burden is not substantially
greater than when the will with testamentary trust is the keystone
of the estate plan, rather than the revocable living trust.
The essential difference comes from the fact that the draftsman
who utilizes the revocable living trust instead of the will must
charge and be paid a realistic fee for his current services; he has no
near-vested interest in the client's estate at the client's death com-
parable to that enjoyed by the draftsman of a will which permits
the latter to charge a completely non-realistic fee (or no fee at all)
for his estate planning services, secure in the knowledge that he or
his firm will almost certainly be employed to represent the execu-
tor during the probate of the estate."" The magnitude of the eco-
nomic reward for this service has been previously commented on.
The fee, then, charged his client by the draftsman of the living
trust should be substantial enough that, consistent with the criteria
set forth in the canons of ethics,'9 he is amply compensated for his
services on a current basis completely without reference to any
post-death bonus. This cost is one the client must be persuaded to
incur, notwithstanding the advantages purchased by him will not be
substantially realized until after his death. This means, of course,
that the amount of the charge must, nevertheless, be modest when
set alongside expected savings. The grantor must also be informed
that there will likely be some additional legal costs after his death
relating primarily to the necessity for filing inheritance tax and
estate tax returns. However, it can be pointed out that such serv-
ices should be compensated on the strength of their own merits, the
same as any other specific legal services. It will also be noted that
custom and practice does not require that the draftsman perform
these services.
The other elements of "cost" described above-current cost of
operating the trust, and the cost measured in loss of control-are
best dealt with, in the view of the writer, by the combined factors
of (1) the selection of trustees and (2) non-disclosure of the trust
during the grantor's life.
1. Selection of the Trustees. The writer wishes to make clear
that he is no enemy of the trust companies. He is a firm believer
in the worth of their contributions to the solution of problems of
property ownership and management and recommends their use in
almost every instance where the term of a trust survives the death
of the grantor, and in some instances where this is not so. How-
ever, to avoid needless trust management expenses and an unac-
ceptable loss of control and freedom of management with regard to
his estate during the grantor's lifetime, the writer suggests in most
cases that the grantor and two other individuals serve as trustees
18 Not only would the normal attorney-client relationship be expected to produce this result, all
things being equal, but in most communities it is the announced practice of the corporate fiduciaries,
when named executor in wills, to employ the respective draftsmen to represent them during probate
of the particular estates. This is an area where restraint on the part of the attorney in initial charges
and the requisite amount of patience are twin virtues likely to be handsomely rewarded at a later date.
19 "In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider: (1) the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
cause; . . . (4) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
services . . ." Canons of Professional Ethics, § 12.
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until the grantor's death or legal incapacity, at which time a pre-
designated trust company takes over as successor, generally sole,
trustee.
There is, of course, no legal barrier to the grantor's serving as
his own trustee.' 0 The insertion of additional individual trustees in
the picture is for the simple purpose of facilitating the transfer of
the title to the trust res to the successor trustee upon the death or
legal incapacity of the grantor. Without the probable factor of sur-
vivorship of one or both of the two co-trustees, the mechanics- of
transfer of legal title with respect to the trust res to the successor
trustee at death or adjudicated incapacity of the grantor-trustee
would require the intervention of a court (although the trust would
certainly not fail). It is, of course, the avoidance of any court in-
tervention (whether probate or otherwise) which is sought to be
achieved by use of the revocable living trdst.
The duties and responsibilities of the individual trustees other
than the grantor are real but not generally substantial. All income
from the trust res is reserved by the grantor to himself during his
life. It can be received by him in his capacity as a trustee and used
20 The grantor can be sole beneficiary if he is one of two or more trustees, or he can be sole
trustee if he is one of two or more beneficiaries. 2 Scott, Trusts 114 (2d ed. 1956). Both conditions
apply under the technique suggested herein.
In Colorado, the case of Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935), thought by some
to require a contrary conclusion, is easily distinguishable. There the grantor, purporting to establish a
trust with another as trustee, retained possession in herself for life in a non-fiduciary capacity, olong
with the "rents, issues and profits" and the power of revocation. The court properly held this to be
an attempted testamentary disposition. This distinction is recognized in the Von Brecht case (see note
6, supro) where transfer of title and possession to the trustee was actually accomplished.
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by him as a beneficiary. His retained power to amend, alter or re-
voke the trust gives him effective (and legal21 ) control over the
corpus. The other trustees share with him (as joint tenants with
right or survivorship 22 ) the legal title to the trust assets. In the
event of the grantor-trustee's absence (explained or unexplained)
or his physical or mental incapacity (short of legal adjudication)
the other trustees, under a well-written instrument, will, acting
without the grantor-trustee, have authority to expend trust income
and corpus for the benefit of the grantor and his dependents. Their
prime duty, of course, comes after the grantor's death or adjudicated
incapacity in transferring title to trust assets to their successor
trustee.
Although complete and detailed record-keeping by the trustees
of the affairs of the trust is to be encouraged (and good business
practice would dictate that this be done), a certain informality in
this regard should not be fatal to the bona fides of the trust. The
federal tax law, of course, treats the revocable living trust as a
nullity for tax purposes; the grantor continues to report all income
from the trust in his personal return and is given the benefit of all
deductions of the trust, just as though the trust did not exist.
23 It
further appears that there is no requirement that the trustees of a
revocable living trust file a Form 1041 (fiduciary income tax re-
turn) with respect to the trust income..2 4 Most state laws follow this
rule (or apply no penalty for non-compliance with rettrn require-
ments). In the administration of the typical trust of this type dur-
ing the grantor's lifetime, distinctions between income and principal
(except for income tax purposes) are generally ignored.
The very existence of a revocable trust frequently breaks down
what might otherwise be a psychological resistance on the part of an
individual to keeping his financial house in order (thereby avoiding
the problem of marshalling the assets that confronts many executors
upon the death of their testators). An accurately maintained in-
ventory of trust assets is a minimum requisite.
Viewed against the foregoing, it is apparent that adult mem-
bers of the grantor's family, or close friends or business associates,
might well serve as co-trustees with him. Normally they would be
expected to serve without compensation. Closeness of relationship
brings no adverse tax results, of course, because of the absence of
estate tax or income tax advantages in the use of the revocable
trust.
Selection of the successor corporate trustee brings into play all
the criteria normally employed in the selection of a corporate fidu-
ciary.
2. Non-disclosure of the Trust. It is the writer's recommenda-
tion that the existence of the trust be not disclosed (so far as the
21 The court in Denver Not'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 97, 322 P.2d 667, 671 (1958), quotes
with favor from National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1949): "A reservation
by a Settlor of the power to control investments [resulting from the reservation of a power to alter,
amend or revoke the trust] does not impair the validity of the trust."
22 2 Scott, Trusts § 194 (2d ed. 1956).
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671, 676.
24 Rev. Rul. 57-51, 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6, at 14.
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general public is concerned) during the grantor's lifetime. This
stems not from any apprehension that the revocable trust is not a
respectable legal vehicle or that knowledge of its existence would
invite attack. It arises, rather, from a recognition that the freedom
of trustees to deal with the assets of a trust is substantially inhibited
if transfer agents, title examiners, and potential buyers and sellers
are put on notice of the existence of a trust. Over the years the law
has placed great burdens on persons dealing with trustees and trust
assets to inquire into the authority of the trustees to act.25 The fear
of such persons that they may suffer economic loss by failure to so
ascertain this authority frequently restricts the ability of trustees
to buy or sell trust assets on a favorable basis.
The usual way for a trustee to conceal the existence of a trust
is to carry the title to trust assets in the name of a nominee. Most
all corporate fiduciaries have one or more such nominees (individ-
uals, partnerships or corporations) for this purpose (certain admin-
istrative economies can also be achieved by professional trustees in
the use of the nominee). Consequently, a revocable living trust
should contain provisions permitting nominee registration of trust
assets.
A variety of nominee techniques are available to the individual
co-trustees during the grantor's life. The most useful (and most
obvious) one is the placing of legal title in the joint names of the
trustees with rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common,
without indicating their fiduciary capacities. This should be sup-
ported by a private agreement signed by all the trustees and kept in
the possession of the grantor in which they acknowledge that when-
ever they hold title to property in the manner described above. they
are doing so as trustees of a particularly described trust, and not
for their individual benefits. In effect, the trustees are ser-ing in
their individual capacities as nominees for themselves as trustees.
The survivorship feature insures the probability of Pomecne being
available with the legal capacity and the equitab'e duly of making
the final transfer to the permanent successor trustee (er. in a .roper
case, outright to persons designated in the trust instr7-ment) upon
the demise or legal incapacity of the grantor.
This technique lends itself particularly to securities,-" real
estate, and savings accounts. In many areas, (including Denver)
checking accounts can likewise be maintained in the names of three
joint tenants. In a few instances, the trustees may have to use the
names of only two of their number as nominees, but this should af-
ford no problem. Dividend and interest checks made out in the
three names can be deposited in a checking account established in
the joint names of the nominees without necessity of personal en-
dorsement. Funds can then be checked out for the benefit of the
income beneficiary.
Where securities are concerned, a simplification of the forego-
ing can be achieved through use of a joint brokerage account in the
individual names of the trustees. "Street name" registration of se-
curities by the broker removes some of the cumbersomeness of the
25 Restatement (Second), Trusts §§ 288, 291, 297, 326 (1959).
26 Watch, however, inclusion of stock of so-called "Sub-chapter 5" or "tax-option" corporations.
Ownership by a trust will disqualify the corporation from the tax benefits of Sub-chapter S. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
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three-name registration and makes easy the handling of income.
Furthermore, transfer of trust assets is facilitated as the signatures
of all trustees (or the prior execution of assignments separate from
certificates by one or more of them) is rendered unnecessary. This
multiple signature requirement normally would be a problem only
when one of the trustees lives some distance away, is temporarily
absent, or is physically incapacitated.
It is frequently possible to handle tangible personal assets in
the three-name manner as well. A properly executed bill of sale
and the "back-up" nominee agreement should provide sufficient
authority for the trustees to deal with such assets, notwithstanding
that actual possession is retained by the grantor as one of the trus-
tees.2 7 An alternative available where grantor and his spouse are
both alive is the execution of a joint agreement where each rec-
ognizes that certain tangible personalty (described generally or
specifically) is owned by them as joint tenants with rights of sur-
vivorship. Such an agreement should have the salutory effect of
avoiding probate as to such assets while making it unnecessary to
transfer such assets into trust.
Nominee alternatives to the three-name joint tenancy practice
are afforded by the use of "dummy" corporations and partnerships.
In either case, a contract between the corporation or the partnership
and the grantor (or the trustees) is executed which affirms that the
legal entity, for a valuable consideration, is holding title to particu-
lar assets solely as agent or nominee and subject to the order of the
grantor (or the trustees). Where the grantor is a party to the agency
contract, his rights therein should be made expressly assignable, in
order to permit transfer to his trustees. Where a grantor owns oil
interests in a number of states, for example, the proper use of the
corporation for title holding purposes in avoiding a number of costly
ancillary administrations is apparent (although such a corporation
should be qualified to do business in the several states). Inheritance
tax obligations at the grantor's death must still be examined by the
trustees.
28
In a proper case an existing active corporation (rather than a
"dummy" created for the purpose) can be used for this nominee
purpose. Where a "dummy" is used, care must be exercised to pre-
vent its being treated as a taxable entity. Proper maintenance of
corporate minutes, avoidance of bank accounts in the corporate
name, and the filing of corporate income tax returns showing "no
assets, no liabilities, no income, no expenses" should assist towards
this end. Dividend checks received in the corporate name should
probably be endorsed to the trustees or directly to the income bene-
ficiary without deposit in a corporate account, although, properly
substantiated, even this should afford no problem. A partnership
used for this purpose would hold title to assets in its entity name.
27 That this arrangement is not entirely unrealistic is supported by the fact tax conscious indi-
viduals sometimes make gifts of valuable tangibles such as art works, libraries, yachts, and the like
to charities, reserving possession for life. Whether this is technically a reserved legal life estate or a
reserved life interest in a trust, the technique appears entirely valid and is recognized for tax purposes
(the grantor gets a current income tax deduction for the actuarial value of the remainder interest in the
object and the entire value is removed from his estate for estate tax purposes. Rev. Rut. 57.293,
1957-2 Cum. Bull. 153).
28 Although no special tax advantages have been claimed herein for the revocable living trust, it
appears that in some jurisdictions there is no inheritance tax at grantor's death with respect to
assets of such a trust. For example, Nebraska and Wyoming appear to be such jurisdictions.
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Careful records should be maintained on behalf of the partnership,
also.
As in the case of the use of the individual joint tenancy, the
purpose of the corporation or partnership is to assure that, even
though the trust is undisclosed, there is a facility for the transfer of
legal title to trust assets available to the surviving trustees after the
death or legal incapacity of the grantor, thereby making recourse
to a court decree unnecessary in the chain of title. Other acceptable
forms of nominee arrangement can probably be devised by imagina-
tive draftsmen.
The handling of unincorporated business interests as trust as-
sets is a little more difficult. An unrecorded bill of sale or assign-
ment of tangible and intangible assets and accounts receivable to
the individual trustees (in their fiduciary capacities or as nominees)
probably takes care of a proprietorship. The fact that such an un-
disclosed assignment may or may not be enforceable as against
creditors is not particularly relevant as the writer is presuming a
willingness on the part of the grantor to have his just debts paid
both during his lifetime and after his death. Consequently, the
properly drawn trust instrument will impose upon the trustees the
obligation to pay the grantor's debts at death to the extent his pro-
bate estate, if any, is unable to pay them. We are entitled to pre-
sume that the grantor, as income beneficiary during his lifetime,
will discharge his business debts as they arise.
A partnership interest is a bit more difficult. While, under the
entity theory of partnerships adopted under the Uniform Partner-
ship Laws, the assignment of a partnership interest carries with it
all the assets and rights making up such interest,'2 9 an assignment
not permitted by the partnership agreement or consented to by the
partners is of limited efficacy. 30 The writer and his associates have,
therefore, found it useful, where possible, to insert a provision in
partnership agreements consenting to a partner's transfer of his
partnership interest to trustees of a revocable trust so long as the
partner is one of the trustees and the principal beneficiary. Again,
whether or not such an assignment is effective to frustrate rights of
creditors of the partner-grantor or of the partnership is not relevant,
for reasons mentioned above. The limited objective, of course, is to
vest the individual trustees with the legal right to transfer title to
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 104-1-25, 27 (1953).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-27 (1953).
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the assets making up the partnership interest to the successor trustee
upon death of the grantor, or, in, the alternative, to carry out the
provisions of any buy-sell agreement that the grantor-partner or his
trustees may have been party to.
Although not essential to the avoidance of probate objective, it
would seem sound estate planning in many cases to have the death
proceeds of life insurance and similar contracts made payable to the
trustees of the revocable trust.3 1 This can be accomplished by a
mere change in beneficiary designation.
Summarizing this section on the costs of using the revocable
living trust, it will be apparent that, other than the original costs of
draftsmanship and supervision by an attorney, the actual costs, both
in dollars and in loss of control, will be entirely minimal during the
lifetime of the grantor. The economic objective of avoiding the
costs of probate, therefore, will not be seriously frustrated.
32
B. The Continuing Need for a Will
Notwithstanding the use of the revocable living trust as a will
substitute, the draftsman is well-advised to prepare at the same time
(for execution after the trust has been executed33 ) a simple will of
the "pour-over" variety. The effect of the will is to transfer to the
trust in a testamentary distribution any assets deliberately or inad-
vertently not included in the living trust, thereby funneling all as-
sets through the trust in the interest of comprehensive estate plan-
ning. Where the preparatory work has been thoroughly done by the
draftsman and the grantor has conscientiously followed instructions
in his subsequent activities, there will be no need to do more than
simply lodge this will with the probate court upon the grantor's
death.
Regardless of liberalizing laws in some states, 4 the writer and
his associates deem it desirable to physically bind into the will a
conformed copy of the living trust for identification purposes. Lan-
guage is also inserted in the will to the effect that, if the trust
should have been revoked or for any reason be void or become in-
valid, the executor must nevertheless distribute the assets of the
estate to a named trustee (normally the trust company named as
successor trustee in the trust) to be used, handled and distributed
according to the terms of a testamentary trust whose provisions are
identical with those set forth in the revoked or void living trust. By
having a copy of the trust bound into the will, there can be no ques-
tion as to what these terms are.
Of course, if the grantor truly wanted to revoke his living trust
because the terms were no longer satisfactory to him, he would
take the additional precaution of changing his will (or of revising
the trust and the "pour-over" will). The foregoing technique is
31 Colorado lawyers will be mindful that where, as here, the trust is charged with the payment
of creditors, there will be a probable loss of the Colorado inheritance tax exemption on life insurance.
32 Figures as to savings used in actual examples appearing earlier in the text are net after
drafting fees and post-death legal services.
33 See discussions of pour-aver problems in Shattuck op. cit., supra note 4, § 14; Polasky, "Pour-
Over Wills," 98 Trusts and Estates 949 et. seq. (1959). See in particular Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, Ch. 286.
34 Colo. Sess. Lows 1959, Ch. 286; Polasky, supro note 33.
SAHS-LARLLOR- CORPORTIOn SERLS- APINE 5-3422
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
really intended to frustrate attack by a disgruntled party contending
revocation or invalidity of the living trust. Even if he is successful
in such action, he will be faced with an identical testamentary dis-
tribution of the estate, the only difference being that the value of
the estate is now diminished by the probate and administrative costs
that would otherwise be avoided. 5
For the above reasons, and whether or not the applicable law
so requires, the writer continues to recommend, whenever changes
are made in the terms of the living trust, that the will thereafter be
republished or rewritten, with the revised trust provisions physical-
ly bound therein.
C. Miscellaneous Drafting Suggestions.
In addition to the normal instructions, limitations, powers and
duties pertinent to good trust draftsmanship, the writer urges that
consideration be given to the following items in drafting a revocable
living trust designed as a will substitute:
1. Payment of Grantor's Debts and Taxes. Responsible drafts-
men will impose upon the trustees the affirmative duty to pay the
just debts and taxes of the grantor to the extent the probate estate,
if any, cannot do so. While taxing authorities have laws sufficient
to protect themselves, it may be that other bona fide creditors would
find their rights to be paid cut off or diminished in some jurisdic-
tions. This has been previously commented on.
2. Elections with Respect to Filing Estate, Income, and Gift Tax
Returns. Because of probable elimination of a probate estate, the
duty to file estate and inheritance tax returns may necessarily fall
on the trustees of the living trust.3 6 This could also be true with
respect to final income tax 37 and gift tax38 returns of the deceased
grantor. The trustees, therefore, should be expressly armed with
the authority to make the various elections with respect to such re-
turns. These include, for example, whether to deduct certain ad-
ministrative expenses from the estate tax return or the income tax
return-which election can affect the size of the marital deduction
share, if any, and the rights of income beneficiaries and remainder-
men under some circumstances; whether to file a joint income tax
return with the deceased grantor's spouse-and assume liability for
possible tax deficiencies of such spouse; and whether to file a joint
gift tax return with the deceased grantor's spouse.
3. Exoneration of Successor Trustees from Liability with Re-
spect to the Administration of Prior Trustees. An argument some-
times heard as a reason not to use a revocable living trust in the
manner outlined in this paper is that the successor corporate trustee,
because of its liability for the acts and doing of its predecessors,
would have to charge an acceptance fee so substantial (to cover the
expense of an audit of prior accounts) that the hoped for savings in
avoiding probate administration would fail to be realized. This is
nonsense. The successor trustee should be expressly exonerated
35 For this reason the writer and his associates had no hesitancy in recommending the use of the
revocable living trust as a will substitute even during that period of time, prior to the 1958 Colorado
Supreme Court reversal of the lower court holding in the Von Brecht case (note 6. supra), when the
validity of this form of property disposition in Colorado was thought by some to be in doubt.
36 int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2203.
37 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6012(b)(1).
.3.4 Treas. Regs. 25.6019-1(b) (1958).
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from the duty of inquiring into the prior administration and spe-
cifically permitted to conclude that the assets turned over to it by
the prior trustees constitutes the entire trust estate.
4. Nominee Powers. As discussed at length earlier, a power per-
mitting the trustees to hold title to trust assets in the name or names
of one or more nominees is essential to the smooth operation of the
trust during the grantor's lifetime.
5. Power to Revoke. Last but not least is the power to revoke,
alter or amend retained by the grantor. This permits the trust in-
strument to be as ambulatory as a will and thereby qualify in all
respects as a will substitute.
In conclusion, the writer believes that the current cost of pro-
bate administration is nothing more nor less than another "death
tax" levied on the assets of a decedent's estate; that this particular
expenditure produces nothing of benefit for the family of the de-
ceased; that this drain on an estate is tolerated by the general public
only because it has been led to believe that such costs are "normal"
and unavoidable. The writer urges that the legal profession give
greater consideration to the use of the revocable living trust as a
means of reducing the high cost of dying.
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A LAW FIRM PENSION PLAN?
By LESTER R. RUSOFF*
Two areas of tax law meet here. One relates to pension plans
and the other relates to the treatment of unincorporated organiza-
tions as corporations for tax purposes.
Substantial tax advantages can be obtained if an employer es-
tablishes a pension plan, meeting certain requirements, for the bene-
fit of his employees. An employer may deduct his contributions to
the plan.' Income earned by principal accummulated under the plan
s exempt from income taxation. 2 Contributions made by the em-
ployer are not taxed to the employees when the contributions are
made but only when benefits are distributed or made available to
them,3 and if the interest of an employee is distributed within one
taxable year on account of his death or separation from the employ-
er's service, his gain is taxed only as long-term capital gain.4 Be-
cause of these tax advantages, a qualified pension plan is especially
beneficial to persons in high tax brackets. Their contributions to
such a plan may give them much greater after-tax benefits than
they would receive from comparable increases in salary.
The Internal Revenue Code extends these privileges, however,
only to a plan "of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his em-
ployees or their beneficiaries. "5 Thus a plan does not qualify if the
employer is included as a participant.6 This does not create diffi-
culties in the case of a corporate employer, because shareholder-
employees may participate in a plan without necessarily preventing
it from qualifying. 7 However, it prevents an individual proprietor
or a member of a partnership from participating in a qualified plan.
This situation has led to efforts in two directions. First, legisla-
tion has been proposed to allow the self-employed to deduct sums
which they set aside for their own retirement. H. R. 10, to this ef-
fect, is now under consideration. Second, some unincorporated
groups have sought to use the concept of an "association" to gain
the income tax treatment of a corporation and thus to establish
qualified pension plans.
The Commissioner has long used the concept of an "association"
to extract additional taxes. This concept appears in the definition
of a corporation, which is stated to include associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies.8 Thus, the Commissioner has
been able to impose the corporate income tax on the group and then
to tax its members on amounts distributed to them, as dividends.
This approach has not been much of a threat to partnerships of doc-
tors or lawyers, probably because such partnerships have rarely
desired to imitate the basic characteristics of a corporation and be-
cause such partnerships, if treated as associations, could usually de-
*Mr. Rusoff is Professor of Low at the University of Montana School of Low.
1 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404.
2 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, 501(a).
I nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402(a).
4 int. Rev. Code of 1954, 402(a)(2).
5 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a).
6 I.T. 3268, 1939-1 Cum. Bull. (Port 1) 196.
7 Treas. Reg. J 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956), as amended, T. D. 6301, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 197.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(3).
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duct substantially all of the earnings of the group as salaries paid to
members, so that no substantial corporate tax would be incurred.
Because of present interest of doctors and lawyers in setting up
qualified pension plans, however, we must inquire into the law
which developed when the concept of an association was used pki-
marily to collect more taxes from unincorporated groups. The lead-
ing case was Morrissey v. Commissioner.9 In that case, real estate
was transferred to trustees. They were authorized to choose their
successors, to buy, sell, and operate land, to construct and operate
golf courses and club houses, to receive the income, to make invest-
ments, and generally to manage the property as if they were the
owners. The trustees had no power to create liability personal to
the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were to get transferable certifi-
cates of interest. Neither the death of a trustee nor that of a bene-
ficiary was to terminate the trust. The Supreme Court held that the
group was an association and could be taxed as a corporation. It
said, "The inclusion of associations with corporations implies resem-
blance; but it is resemblance and not identity."'10 The Court indicat-
ed that the result was influenced by: the existence of associates in
an enterprise for doing business and provisions making for continui-
ty of existence, centralization of management, transferability of
beneficial interests, and limited liability.
Which factors were most significant? It has been thought that
they were centralization of management and continuity of life.11
This seems to have been the position of the Treasury Department
under the 1939 Code.1'
2
The next question is this: does local law govern in deciding
whether the essential characteristic of an association exists? The
regulations under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code gave the impres-
sion that it did not. They included this statement:
For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code
makes its own classification and prescribes its own stand-
ards of classification. Local law is of no importance in this
connection. Thus .... I] he term "corporation" is not limit-
ed to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation,
but includes also ... certain kinds of partnerships.
1 3
The Supreme Court used language pointing the same way:
Neither the conception of unincorporated associations pre-
vailing under the local law, nor the relation under that law
of the association to its shareholders, nor their relation to
each other and to outsiders, is of legal significance as bear-
ing upon the power of Congress to determine how and at
what rate the income of the joint enterprise shall be taxed.
14
The regulations might have been interpreted to mean only that
federal law determined the standards of classification of an associa-
tion and that local law determined whether those standards are met
in a given case; but the language of the Supreme Court seems to
give local law no effect.
Only one case, apparently, held that a group of professional men
9 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
10 Id. at 357.
11 Driscoll, The Limited Partnership and the Association Question, 1960 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 539, 553.
12 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2, 39.3797-4(a) (1953).
13 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1953).
14 Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925).
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was taxable as an association, before such classification became a
benefit rather than a burden. That case was Pelton v. Commission-
er.'" There, several doctors transferred their equipment to them-
selves as trustees, with authority to operate a clinic or any allied
business. They agreed that the trustees should not be personally
liable for acts done in performing their duties. This attempt to limit
liability apparently did not apply to the individual doctors as doc-
tors. There was a provision for filling vacancies among the trustees.
The beneficial interests were held by the transferors and were to be
transferable by them, subject to an option in the other beneficiaries
to buy before there should be any transfers to outsiders. During
the taxable years in question, the transferors were the only bene-
ficiaries. Thus, this organization had provisions for continuity of
life and modified transferability of interests but did not really have
centralization of management or limited liability. The Court, how-
ever, thought that the four characteristics of continuity, centraliza-
tion, limited liability, and transferability were sufficiently present
so that the organization should be treated as an association, subject
to the corporate income tax.
The question of whether a professional partnership can be
treated as an association became acute when pension plans became
popular. Then it was seen that the concept of an association might
be turned against the Commissioner. In United States v. Kintner,'"
a partnership of doctors dissolved and reorganized as an unincor-
porated association. Eight doctors became members. They dele-
gated management to an executive committee of five. It was pro-
vided that the interests of members should be non-assignable and
that the death or retirement of a member would not dissolve the
association. There seems to have been no attempt to protect the
members of the group from personal liability.
The court held that the clinic was an association for tax pur-
poses and that its pension plan, which included primarily the doc-
tors who were the members of the association, was a qualified plan.
The court said:
It should be added that it would introduce an anarchic ele-
ment in the federal taxation if we determined the nature
of associations by State criteria rather than by special
criteria sanctioned by the tax law, the regulations and the
15 82 F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
16 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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courts. It would destroy the uniformity so essential to a
federal tax system,-a uniformity which calls for equal
treatment of taxpayers, no matter in what State their ac-
tivities are carried on. For it would mean that tax incid-
ences as to taxpayers in the same category would be de-
termined differently according to the law of the State of
residence."
Recently, a similar decision was made by a federal district court
in Texas. 8 In that case, a group of seven doctors formed an associa-
tion to replace a partnership. Their motive, as found by the court,
was to solve problems relating to a need for centralized manage-
ment, limitation of liability of the individual doctors, continuity of
life, and a better method of holding title to the property. They
agreed to elect a board of directors of six, which was to appoint an
executive committee of two to handle details, subject to control by
the board of directors. Interests of the members were to be trans-
ferable, subject to an option in the group and the other members
to buy at the offering price. It was provided that the members
should not be liable for debts of the group or of any member until
the assets of the group and of the defaulting member should be ex-
hausted. Assets of the group were not to be distributed until the
termination of the association, which was to last for 35 years. The
agreement of the parties, then, purported to provide for centraliza-
tion of management, continuity of life, and modified transferability
of interests. It did not establish limited liability like that of cor-
porate stockholders. The government took the position that the tax-
payer, a member of the association, was taxable on his proportionate
interests in a reserve fund set aside by the association and returned
by it as corporate income. The court held for the taxpayer.
The government has not acquiesced in the Kintner or Galt
decisions.1 9 For a time, it held that if a partnership adopted the
corporate form to get the benefits of a qualified pension plan, it was
a partnership for all purposes. 20 Later it ruled that the mere fact
that a group attempted to set up a qualified pension plan would not
determine whether it was a partnership or an association.
2' 1
Now, proposed regulations have been issued. 22 Our present
question, then, is: are those regulations consistent with the decided
cases, and will it be practicable, under them, for a professional part-
nership to adopt such a form as to be able to establish a qualified
pension plan? It seems generally to be assumed that, if a profes-
sional partnership can so reorganize as to be an "association," its
members will be treated as "employees" under the provisions relat-
ing to pension plans, but at least one source has urged caution as to
this.
23
A striking feature of the proposed regulations is the following
language:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local
17 216 F. 2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
18 Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp 360, 1959-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73,513 (N.D. Tex. 1959). (The facts
in this case are reported in U.S. Tax Cas. but not in F. Supp.).
19 The government appealed the Gait decision, but the appeal was dismissed on November 24,
1959. No further details as to the dismissal appear to be available.
20 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. bull. 598.
21 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886.
22 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10450 (1959).
23 Tax Approaches, Charles D. Spencer & Associates, Inc., February, 1960.
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law which established the tests or standards which will be
applied in determining the classification in which an or-
ganization belongs, local law governs in determining wheth-
er the legal relationships which have been established in
the formation of an organization are such that the standards
are met. Thus, it is local law which must be applied in de-
termining such matters as the legal relationships of the
members of the organization among themselves and with
the public at large, and the interests of the members of the
organization in its assets.
24
Although one might rationalize the language of the old regula-
tions, which are quoted above, so as to render it consistent with that
of these proposed regulations, the mood and emphasis of the Treas-
ury Department seem definitely to have changed. It seems impos-
sible to reconcile the language of the proposed regulations with that
of the Supreme Court in Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, also
quoted above, or with the fact that in the other cases the courts have
looked only to the agreements made by the parties, without refer-
ence to the local law.
2 5
To weigh the effect of the proposed regulations, however, we
need to learn what standards they set up for determining whether
an organization is an association. They state six standards:
i. Associates,
ii. An objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom,
iii. Continuity of life,
iv. Centralization of management,
v. Liability for corporate debts limited to corporate prop-
erty,
vi. Free transferability of interests.
2 6
The first two standards are common to partnerships and cor-
porations, so that our problem centers around the meaning of the
remaining four standards and the possibility of meeting them.
When does the organization have "continuity of life"? "An or-
ganization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause
a dissolution of the organization." 2 7 The regulations state that, al-
24 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
25 Bittker, The Corporation Income Tax 30 (1959).
26 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
27 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
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though the parties may agree that none of these events shall dis-
solve the organization, there is not continuity of life if under local
law the organization may be dissolved by the occurrence of one of
these events or by an act of a member of the group, even though
that act is a violation of the agreement.2 1 Under Colorado law, the
expulsion of a partner, the death or bankruptcy of a partner, or an
expression of the will of any partner at any time, although in viola-
tion of the agreement of the parties, dissolves a partnership. 9 Also,
a partner or a purchaser of the interest of a partner can get a judi-
cial decree dissolving a partnership." Thus a Colorado partnership
cannot meet the standard of continuity of life set by these regula-
tions.
The next standard discussed by the proposed regulations is
centralization of management. The regulations state that this stand-
ard is met if "any person (or group of persons which does not in-
clude all members) has continuing exclusive authority to make the
management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for
which the organization was formed. ' 3 1 The regulations also state,
however, that in the case of a general partnership an agreement
that the powers of management shall be exclusively in a selected
few is ineffective against outsiders without notice and that there-
fore a general partnership cannot meet this standard.32  Here the
regulations have stated the effect of local law, which seems odd, but
they have done it correctly.3: Thus the standard of centralization of
management cannot be met.
Another standard is limited liability. It is said to exist "if there
is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims
against the organization. '3 4 Under Colorado law, however, all part-




The last standard is that of transferability of interests. This re-
quires that each member be able, without the consent of the others,
to substitute an outsider for himself. He must be able to transfer
all of the attributes of his position, not only his right to share in
profits but also his right to participate in management.3" The regu-
lations recognize that members of a partnership may be unwilling
to permit transfers of interests without having a right first to buy
those interests for themselves. Thus it is stated that a modified forr-
of transferability exists if there is such an option but that this form
of transferability has less weight.1 7 Under Colorado law, a partner-
ship can make an effective agreement that a partner may assign his
interest and that the assignee will step completely into the shoes of
the transferor t 3 The difficulty here may be a practical one, that
members of a law firm, because of the personal character of the re-
lationship among the partners, may be unwilling to make such an
28 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2),(3), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451-2 (1959).
'20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-31 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 31).
to( Colo. Rev, Stat. § 104-1-32 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 32).
:1 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(c)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:32 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(c)(4), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-9 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 9).
34 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(d)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-15 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, . 15).
36 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-1(c)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
37 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-1(e)(2), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:19 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 104-1-18, 27 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 18, 27).
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agreement, even though they provide that any interest must be of-
fered to present partners before it is transferred to an outsider."
Must a group qualify in respect to all of the standards set by
the regulations to be treated as an association? Apparently, it need
not. The text states that "[a] n organization will be treated as an
association if the corporate characteristics are such that the organi-
zation more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or
trust. ' '40 The regulations include examples which indicate that an
organization may be treated as an association if it has the modified
form of transferability of interests and meets two of the standards
of continuity of life, centralization of management, and limited lia-
bility. Modified transferability plus only one of the other character-
istics, such as centralized management, is treated as insufficient.
Thus, the proposed regulations look to local law to determine
whether the standards are met, and under Colorado law those stand-
ards cannot be met. This situation is not peculiar to Colorado. Our
statutes are based on the Uniform Partnership Act, which is law
in at least 38 states and Guam. The same results are likely to occur
in other states, since the act is largely in accord with the common
law.
4 1
Would it be possible to comply with the proposed regulations
by adopting a form that would not be that of a general partnership
under local law but would be that of a limited partnership or a
39 Stutsman, New Kintner Regs. not Retroactive, Give Specific Criteria to Test Partnership,
12 J. Taxation 174, 176 (1960).
40 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
41 Crane, Partnership and Other Unincorporated Associations 7 (2nd ed. 1952).
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trust? This seems doubtful. Limited partners contribute property
to the firm rather than services, so that a limited partnership does
not appear adaptable to the practice of law.42 Is the use of the trust
form a better possibility? Under principles of trust law, a business
can be organized in such form as to 'provide continuity of life, cen-
tralization of management, limited liability, and transferability of
interests, within the meaning of the proposed regulations.
43
Here, however, we meet objections based on legal ethics. The
Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association
has already ruled that it would be improper for members of a law
firm to transfer their interests in the firm to a trust which would
employ the members of the firm and create a pension or profit-
sharing plan for their benefit.44 The committee thought that the
specific proposal before it would not create a trust, because of con-
trol over the trustees reserved to the beneficiaries. At some length,
however, the committee argued that even if a trust were created
the arrangement would violate several of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
Canon 33 prohibits misleading use of a firm name. The com-
mittee thought that the proposed plan would violate this canon by
giving the impression that the firm was a partnership, rather than
a trust. A potential client, if he considered the problem of liability
for malpractice, might suppose that all members of the firm would
be personally liable for the act of any member. This supposition
seems to be correct in the case of a general partnership; if the firm
were a trust, however, only the trustees and the corpus, through
the right of the trustees to reimbursement, would be liable for the
acts of lawyers employed by the trust. Thus there may theoretically
be some merit in this objection by the committee. That this objec-
tion has practical importance seems doubtful.
Canon 34 forbids splitting fees with laymen. The committee
thought that this canon would be doubly violated by the proposal.
First, the fees would be paid to the trustees and would be used by
them, in part, to pay clerks and stenographers. Second, beneficial
interests in the trust, through death or otherwise, might pass to lay-
men. The first objection seems weak, since part of the fees received
by a lawyer generally do go to his clerks and stenographers. The
second might be avoided by prohibiting transfers of beneficial in-
terests to laymen and by making an agreement for the purchase of
the interest of any retiring member of the firm, either by the firm
or by its members.
Canon 35 prohibits the intervention of a lay agency between a
lawyer and his client. The committee thought this canon would be
violated by a provision that all fees be paid to the trustees. The
proposal would have required the trustees to be lawyers, so it is dif-
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-2-4 (1953). (Uniform Limited Partnership Act, § 4).
43 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b),(c) example 2, 24 Fed. Reg. 10454 (1959). It might be
noted that the limited liability available in the case af a trust relates to liability for acts of the
trustees, not to liability for the acts of beneficiaries rendering personal services. Thus, it seems improb-
able that the operation of a legal or medical firm through a trust device, even if otherwise feasible,
would protect a member of the firm from liability for his own malpractice. As a practical matter, this
seems to be the more significant liability for a doctor or a lawyer. For the purpose of classifying a
group as an "association" however, the lock of personal liability for acts of the trustees may be the
significant factor.
44 Opinion 283, 36 A.B.A.J. 870 (1950).
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ficult to see how it would violate this canon any more than the usual
operation of a large law firm.
It may be that the objections raised by the Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics are not very weighty. Its opinion must be consid-
ered, however, and we should also keep in mind that the objections
made to the use of the form of a trust seem equally applicable to an
imitation of corporate form.
Assuming that the Committee on Professional Ethics might
change its opinion or that it might approve a different plan, is there
any possibility of solving the tax difficulties in the way of estab-
lishing a qualified pension plan for a law firm? If the proposed reg-
ulations become final in their present form, the courts may hold
them invalid. Their emphasis on local law is inconsistent with the
language of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Furthermore, that emphasis is inconsistent with the
results in the Pelton, Kintner, and Galt cases that involved groups
of professional men. The leading Kintner case, dealing with the
taxable year 1948, arose in Montana, where the Uniform Partner-
ship Act had been adopted in 1947. It would seem in some areas
of federal taxation, the courts have given considerable weight to
local law. For example, nothing is included in the gross estate of a
decedent on account of a life estate held by him but created by an-
other; state law governs as to whether the decedent in fact had a life
estate.45, It might be said, in general, that federal law determines
the tax consequences of the rights and duties of a taxpayer, but
state law is used to decide what his rights and duties are. The pro-
posed regulations fit this approach. Anyone considering the possi-
bility of contesting their validity ought to study other areas in
which this problem of state versus federal law has arisen.46 He
should also consider the problem of whether the interpretation of
the statute here has become so settled by the existence of regulations
and decisions and the passage of time that the Treasury Department
cannot change it prospectively.4 7 The Treasury may revise the pro-
posed regulations so as to make the provisions of the agreement
among the parties govern, even though they may deprive members
of a firm only of the right to take certain steps and not of the
power.48 It now seems more probable, however, that the Treasury
definitely wants to discourage professional partnerships from adopt-
ing the form of an association. An Under Secretary of the Treasury
has recently written that:
45 Helvering v. Rhodes Estate, 117 F. 2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941).
46 This subject is considered at length in 10 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, J§
61.01-61.09 (Zimet and Stern rev. 1958).
47 1 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, §§ 3.20-3.25 (Zimet, Stanley, and Kilcullen rev.
1956).
48 For arguments that this should be done see: Saltz, Associations, 38 Taxes 187, 191 (1960);
Stutsmnn, New Kintner Regs. not Retroactive, Give Specific Criteria to Test Partnership, 12 J. Taxation






The Internal Revenue Service has administrative problems
in dealing with partnerships which attempt to be treated
as associations in order to allow the members to obtain cov-
erage under qualified pension plans. This constantly raises
difficult questions of substance over form.
49
Congress has had under consideration for some time a bill
which would permit self-employed individuals to make deductible
contributions to retirement plans for their own benefit. If such a
bill becomes law, the interest of professional partnerships in the
use of the form of an association may die, except where there are
practical, non-tax advantages in that form. Fringe benefits other
than pensions may be provided through the form of an association,
but it is not known whether they alone would create substantial in-
terest in the use of that form.
The Treasury has, however, opposed that bill, and now has made
a counter-proposal. The gist of this proposal is that the provisions
relating to pension and profit-sharing plans for employees be re-
vised so that an individual proprietor or a partner may treat him-
self as an employee and participate in such a plan. There are sev-
eral limitations in the proposal: 1. Participation would have to be
open, on a non-discriminatory basis, to employees who are not own-
ers of the business. 2. The owner could participate only if he per-
formed personal services. 3. Contributions for the benefit of the
owner would be limited, at least if none of his employees received
substantial vested interests, and 4. the Treasury would like to abol-
ish the present capital-gains treatment of distributions made in one
year on termination of service. This change would apply to all pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans, regardless of whether the owner of
the business is a participant. For this privilege, the Treasury pro-
poses to substitute some type of averaging of income.
The limitations in the Treasury's proposal do not seem severe.
At present corporations appear able to establish pension plans pri-
marily for the benefit of the shareholder-employees, because they
are permitted to exclude many other employees, such as those paid
wages and those who have been employed for less than five years.
Most law firms have few employees, especially with service of five
years or more, and the inclusion of long-term employees would
probably not be an unjustified hardship on a firm.
We do not, of course, know whether Congress will adopt the
proposal of the Treasury Department. When it adopted provisions
permitting unincorporated businesses to elect to be taxed as corpora-
tions, it specifically provided that a partner or proprietor of such a
business shall not be considered an employee for purposes of the
sections relating to employees' pension trusts.0 The fact that this
present proposal comes from the Treasury Department may make a
substantial difference.
If this proposal is adopted, it seems to answer our problem.
Lawyers will be able to participate in pension plans with substan-
tial tax advantages, and they will not have to change their mode of
operations or risk professional disapproval to do it.
49 Letter of Under Secretary Fred C. Scribner, Jr. to Senator Harry F. Byrd, Chairman, Committee
on Finance, April 1, 1960.
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1361(d).
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
THE MIDDLE INITIAL
By PERCY S. MoRRms*
The Colorado attorney whose practice includes the examina-
tion of titles to property and the approval or rejection of such titles
based on variences concerning middle names and initials is faced
with a serious problem. A consideration of the Colorado cases in
point may suggest some revision of his office procedure.
The problem of "what's in a name" arose early in Colorado in
the 1872 case of Doane v. Glenn' when the court said:
The next error assigned is the refusal of the court to allow
plaintiffs to read in evidence the deposition of James W.
Hanna. Several objections were made by the defendants,
which we will notice in the following order:
1. The commission is to take the deposition of James H.
Hanna, and the deposition taken is that of James W. Hanna.
There is nothing in the first objection. In legal contem-
plation, the middle letter constitutes no part of one's name.
The law knows but one Christian name, and the omission
or incorrect insertion of a middle name or initial is imma-
terial in pleading; so also in a commission to take deposi-
tions.:
During the period between 1872 and 1957, there was no decision
of the Colorado Supreme Court involving the question of a vari-
ance with respect to middle initials or names, but there were three
decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals relating to that question.
The first case was German Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Nat'l. State
Bank of Boulder." In that case the variance was between the name
W. J. Motley, which appeared in a garnishment summons served on
a bank, and W. G. Motley, the name of one who had an account in
the bank. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against the
defendant bank, saying in part:
Out of these facts sprang the law which is found laid
down in the early authorities, that the middle letter formed
no part of the name of any person. In other words, in con-
formity with the then existing custom, the court said that a
man was known by l is first name, and accuracy in that re-
spect was all that the law required. The law and the deci-
sions, which were the outgrowth of the existing conditions
of society, can manifestly have no application to our modern
commercial organizations. The wide extension and rapid
increase of population, the great and unprecedented growth
of commercial transactions, have compelled the use of dif-
ferent forms, and the adoption of different methods to dis-
tinguish individuals. The middle name, or the middle letter,
is as much a part of a man's name in this part of the present
century as either his christian [sic] or his surname. The
result is that the more modern authorities in the eastern and
*Mr. Morris is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
1 1 Colo. 495 (18/2), rev'd an other grounds, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 33 (1874).
2 Id. at 502.
33 Colo. App. 17 (1892).
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commercial states have adjudged that the middle letter, or
the middle name, is as essential to the accuracy of the writ
as either the christian [sic] or the surname.
4
However, after having stated that the middle name or middle
letter is as much a part of a man's name as either his Christian or
his surname, the court proceeded to limit and confine its decision
to that particular class of cases, namely, cases which involved garn-
ishments of banks.
The same case5 was again before the Court of Appeals following
a retrial in which the court affirmed its former opinion and then
proceeded to give additional grounds for this affirmation, all of
which related exclusively to business practice in banking.
The third decision of the Court of Appeals was in the case of
Gibson v. Foster,6 where the court said:
The middle name or initial in a person's name has become
quite material in modern times, especially as a distinguish-
ing identification of the person. Many persons now have
the same Christian, or given, name, and the same patro-
nymic, family or surname, and it is by the middle name or
initial only, in many instances, that the person may be dis-
tinguished or identified in writing....
There is no presumption that Albert S. and A. L. Dele-
plane, or that A. S. and A. L. Deleplane, are the same person.
However, the language quoted above was probably dictum,
since the court could have disposed of the variance in names with-
out going into questions relating to the middle name or initial by
basing its decision on the fact that only the initial A of the Christian
name was used instead of the full Christian name Albert.
The great weight of authority supports the early holding of
Doane v. Glenn that in legal contemplation the middle letter con-
stitutes no part of one's name and that the law knows but one
Christian name, and the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle
name or initial is immaterial.
Mr. Patton, in his work on titles, says:
It is an ancient rule that the law shall recognize but two
names of an individual, the family or surname, and the
given or Christian name. Under this rule, if two or more
Christian names are used, the middle name, names, or ini-
tials are disregarded, and any discrepancy therein is im-
material. Of more general acceptance at this time is the
holding that the insertion in one name and the omission in
the other of a middle name or initial is immaterial unless
the first name is itself an initial only. The rule came into
existence at a time when few people had more than two
names, but several courts now hold that in modern times a
middle name or initial has become an essential part of the
given name, for the purpose of distinguishing persons, and
that it should be considered in determining the question of
variance. Whether justified by the decisions of their own
state or not, it has become a very general practice for ex-
4 Id. at 19.
5 German Nlat'l Bank of Denver v. Nat'l State Bank of Boulder, 5 Colo. App. 427 (1895).
6 24 Colo. App. 434, 436 (1913).
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aminers to require additional evidence of identity when the
records show a difference in middle names or initials, or
show their insertion in one only of two otherwise similar
names.'
Attorneys in Colorado, in examining abstracts of title, have
uniformly considered the middle initial or the middle name to be as
much a part of a person's name as the Christian name, or initial, in
spite of the Doane v. Glenn decision. According to Mr. Patton, this
would seem to be in accordance with the general practice for ex-
aminers "whether justified by the decisions of their own state or
not." This practice of the Colorado attorneys is undoubtedly based
upon the realities of the modern day as against a legal fiction based
upon conditions existing in the Middle Ages.
However, the problem has been pinpointed by the Colorado
Supreme Court in two comparatively recent decisions, in which the
rule of Doane v. Glenn is again applied.
7 1 Patton, Titles 76 (2d ed. 1957).
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The first of these two decisions is Nelson v. District Court.-
That case involved the variance of the name Elizabeth G. Nelson,
which was signed to the receipt for a registered letter that was sent
to secure service of process, from the name Elizabeth L. Nelson,
which appeared in the complaint as the name of the defendant. The
court said:
The middle initial is not the test; it is no part of a per-
son's name.
The middle initial is no part of a person's name, accord-
ing to the weight of authority, and, therefore, no import-
ance attaches to its omission, or to the insertion of an er-
roneous initial in place of the correct one. A similar mis-
take made by the insertion of a middle initial where the
correct name contains no middle initial is likewise regarded
as immaterial. . . . 42 Am. Jur., page 86, sec. 99.9
That decision was followed by the supreme court in its opinion
in the case of Clark v. Nat'l Adjusters, Inc.'0 In that case a money
judgment by default had been entered in a previous action, and the
defendant against whom the judgment was obtained brought a suit
to have the judgment vacated and to set aside the proceedings that
had been taken subsequent to such judgment. One of her grounds
of attack upon the service of process in the first action was that she
was improperly named in the summons, the name therein having
been Odessa Clark and not Odessa W. Clark. In passing upon such
ground, the court said, "The omission in the summons of the plain-
tiff's middle initial was immaterial. This court has held that in legal
contemplation such initial constitutes no part of one's name, the law
knowing but one Christian name."'"
The variance in each of the three decisions of the Colorado
Supreme Court did not involve a full middle name. In Doane v.
Glenn'2 and in Nelson v. District Court13 there was a difference in
the middle initials. Clark v. Nat'l Adjusters, Inc., 4 involved the
omission of the middle initial. The Nelson decision made no refer-
ence to middle names, but, in Doane, the court used the phrase "and
the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle name or initial" and
in both the Doane and Clark cases, the court used the phrase "the
law knows but one Christian name."
However, if these decisions are to be considered applicable to
deeds, encumbrances and other instruments affecting title to real
estate, they must be considered to be applicable not only to the in-
sertion or omission of a middle initial but also to the insertion or
omission of a middle name and to the use of a middle name in one
instrument that is entirely different from the middle name used
in the other instrument. If, as the Colorado Supreme Court said,
"the law knows but one Christian name" and if such holding is ap-
plicable to instruments affecting title to real estate, it logically fol-
lows that as long as the Christian name and the surname are the
8 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957).
9 Id. at 480, 320 P.2d at 962.
10 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959).
11 Id. at 595, 348 P.2d at 372.
12 1 Colo. 495 (1872).
13 Supra note 7.
14 Supra note 9.
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same, any variance in the middle name must be disregarded as be-
ing immaterial.
None of these decisions related to variances in names appear-
ing in deeds, deeds of trust and other instruments affecting title to
real estate. Each of them involved proceedings in lawsuits. In
Doane the variance was in a commission for the taking of a deposi-
tion; in Nelson the variance was in the receipt for a registered letter
sent to secure service of process; in Clark the variance was in the
summons. In Doane the court said "the law knows but one Chris-
tian name, and the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle name
or initial is immaterial in pleading, so also in the commission to take
depositions," but in Nelson and in Clark the opinions contained no
language which prevented the rules laid down therein from being
general rules applicable in all situations, including those in which
the instruments affect title to real estate.
Assuming that these decisions are applicable to instruments af-
fecting title to real estate, none of them would impair the effect of
the Colorado curative statute. 15 That statute remedies variances be-
tween names appearing in two instruments, both of which have been
recorded for more than three years, in three situations, namely: (1)
where the full Christian name appears in one instrument and only
the initial letter of that Christian name appears in the other; (2)
where the full middle name appears in one name and only the initial
letter of that middle name appears in the other; and (3) where the
initial letter of a middle name appears in one name and does not
appear in the other. The three cases would not be applicable to a
variance arising from the first of these, namely, the full Christian
name appearing in one instrument and only the initial letter of that
Christian name appearing in the other, because the decisions relate
only to the middle name or the middle initial. If applicable to in-
struments affecting title to real estate, the decisions would render
immaterial the other two variances, namely, the variance arising
from a full middle name appearing in one name and only the initial
letter of that middle name appearing in the other, and the variance
arising from the initial letter of a middle name appearing in one in-
strument and not appearing in the other, because, under such deci-
sions, any variance with respect to the middle name or middle initial
would be immaterial.
However, if such decisions are applicable to instruments affect-
ing title to real estate, they would have a much greater effect upon
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discrepancies in middle names than does the statute. In the first
place, under the statute, both instruments must have been of record
for at least three years, whereas, by the decisions, the variance
would be considered immaterial irrespective of the record date.
Secondly, the variances remedied by the statute are variances which
are not inconsistent with each other, because, in order that the
statute may remedy the defect there must be a situation in which
the middle initial in one instrument is the initial of the middle name
that appears in the other instrument, or a situation in which the
middle initial appears in one name but does not appear at all in the
other name, whereas, under the decisions, the variance would be
considered immaterial no matter how inconsistent the names might
be with each other, so long as the Christian name and the surname
are the same. For example, if the names of the grantee in one in-
strument appeared as John Jones Smith and the name of the gran-
tor in the subsequent instrument appeared as John Robertson Smith
the statute would not apply, but the decisions would render the
variance immaterial because they apply no matter what the dis-
crepancy in the middle names and initials might be. Such a result
would seem to be entirely unacceptable to the overwhelming ma-
jority of attorneys.
Colorado attorneys cannot ignore these decisions. If after ex-
amining the abstract for the purchaser and in accordance with the
general practice of attorneys in this state, one should reject the title
as unmarketable because of a discrepancy such as in the example
cited above, he might find himself faced with the necessity of hav-
ing to sustain his rejection of the title in a suit brought by the pur-
chaser to recover the deposit that had been paid on the purchase
price, by convincing the court that these three Colorado Supreme
Court decisions are not applicable to variances in middle names or
middle initials in instruments affecting the title to real estate.
Three alternative courses should be given consideration by the
attorneys of Colorado. The first of these is for the attorneys of the
state to accept the three decisions as being applicable to instruments
affecting the title to real estate and to pass as immaterial all vari-
ances of every nature in middle names and initials in instruments
affecting title to real estate. The second course is to have presented
to the Colorado Supreme Court for its determination the question
of whether such three decisions are applicable to instruments affect-
ing title to real estate. The third course is to seek legislative enact-
ment of a statute which expressly sanctions the general practice of
Colorado attorneys, which now exists and has existed for many
decades, of considering the middle name and the middle initial as
material parts of a person's name.
In my opinion, the first course, that of accepting the decisions
as applying to instruments affecting title to real estate, is unthink-
able, since it would not only upset the general practice of attorneys
in this state, but it would ignore the realities of the modern age in
which the middle name or initial must be considered as a part of the
identification of a person. It would result in great confusion, par-
ticularly with respect to the necessity of including in abstracts those
judgments against, wills of, and decrees of heirship with respect to
persons having the same Christian name and surname but different
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middle initials or middle names as compared with the names of the
owners of record of the properties.
The second course, that of securing a determination from the
court of the question of whether the three decisions are applicable
to variances in names in instruments affecting title to real estate,
is also impracticable. A case involving this question would require
several years of litigation if commenced in the district court and
reviewed on writ of error and in the meantime, the confusion and
uncertainty would continue to exist.
The most practical and logical solution is through legislative
action. The Legislature could resolve the problem simply by adding
the following language at the beginning of the 1953 Colorado Re-
vised Statutes, Sec. 118-6-16: "The middle name or the initial of a
middle name appearing in a name contained in an instrument af-
fecting title to real estate or in a signature or an acknowledgment
thereto shall be deemed prima facie to be a material part of such
name"; and by which amendment there are also inserted the words
"Provided, however, that" at the beginning of the first sentence of
said section as it now reads. Such a statute would be consistent
with the reasoning of the Colorado Court of Appeals in German
National Bank of Denver v. Nat'l. State Bank of Boulder 16 and in
Gibson v. Foster.17 The validity and constitutionality of such amend-
ment would be unassailable, because it would relate to the prima
facie presumption of identity of persons resulting from identity of
names, and therefore would merely state a rule of evidence. Fur-
thermore, such amendment might be enacted in the session of the
Legislature which begins in January, 1961 which would avoid a long
period of uncertainty.
16 3 Colo. App. 17 (1892).
17 24 Colo. App. 434 (1913).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of
late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting,
and publishing books without the consent of the authors
and proprietors . . . to their very great detriment, and too
often to the ruin of them and their families; for preventing
such practices for the future, and for the encouragement of
learned men to compose and write useful books, be it en-
acted ... -Act of 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
England in the days of Queen Anne foresaw the burgeoning of
the fields of literary endeavor on a scale not theretofore known to
the world. The advent of a workable, moveable-type printing press
more than two hundred years before had seen to that. No longer
was the onus of dissemination of literary fruits to an eager world
placed upon the hunched shoulders and bleary eyes of monks labor-
ing within the grey walls of a monastary. It is most unlikely, how-
ever, that good Queen Anne and her charges could have envisioned
the mass media for the propagation of the Arts as we know them
today.
The impact of the "terrible trio" of the entertainment field-
the sightless but not soundless purveyor of audio Arts, Radio; the
celluloid gobbling marvel, Movies; and that one-eyed, all-seeing
Cyclops, Television-upon an awed twentieth century literary elite
has been radical. The greedy maws of the terrible trio constantly
place ever-widening demands upon hapless authors and composers.
The result, aside from a wide variety of works ranging from trash
to classic, has been the placement of an additional burden upon the
virtues and the vices of the provisions of our prevailing copyright
laws.
The sole source of congressional power to legislate in a protec-
tive way for the betterment of authors and composers derives from
that section of the United States Constitution allowing the legisla-
tive branch of the national government ". . . to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, ..."1 From that slim reed stem our
present day copyright statutes.
The major purpose of this paper will be to point out the short-
comings of current copyright laws of the United States in the area
tMr. Rittenhouse is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, the full text of which is: "The Congress shall have power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive right to their Writings and Discoveries."
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of survivorship and renewal rights. In this all-important sector of
the Copyright Act,2 one section is primarily controlling.
3
The evolution of Section 24 of the present act has been a long
and tortuous one dating back to the original Copyright Act of 1790.1
The first major revision of the copyright statutes of interest in the
field of renewal rights came in the year 1831. ", The addition of spe-
cific survivorship rights to the author's widow and children, if they
had remained alive beyond his life span, as stated in the report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
... was 'chiefly to enlarge the period for the enjoyment of
copy-right, and there-by to place the authors in this coun-
try more nearly upon an equality with authors in other
countries.... In the United States, by existing laws, a copy-
right is secured to the author, in the first instance, for four-
teen years; and if, at the end of that period, he be living,
then for fourteen years more; but if he be not then living,
the copy-right is determined, although by the very event of
the death of the author, his family stand in more need of
the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them.'
Register of Debates, vol. 7, appendix CXIX.6
This tangible manifestation of legislative intent stands as one of the
few guideposts of substance by which we may trace a course through
the shoals and murky waters of an insubstantial segment of the law.
Before making an attempt to gain an insight on the judicial in-
terpretations levied upon this section of copyright law, it may be
well to pause and assay the reasons for the relative paucity of re-
2 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 1 (1958).
3 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 24 (1958). Duration; renewal and extension. "The copyright secured
by this title shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication, whether the copy-
right bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name: Provided,
That in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical. cyclopedia, or other composite work
upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted
by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the original author) or by on employer
for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal
and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when applica-
tion for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered
therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further,
That in the case of any copyrighted work, including a contribution by on individual author to a period-
ical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or
children be not living, the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight
years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office
and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright:
And provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension,
the copyright in any work shall be determined at the expiration of twenty-eight years from first
publication."
4 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 124, provided for a term of 14 years from date of record-
ing title of work to be copyrighted in the clerk's office of the district court. A renewal for a period of
14 years was secured by this act to the author or authors living at the expiration of the first term or
their executors, administrators, or assigns.
5 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, the original term for which the copyright was secured
was extended to 28 years. Terms of renewal remained at 14 years. The privilege of renewal under the
Act was granted to the author, or if dead, then to his widow or children.
6 Fisher Music Co. v. Witmork & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943). The Court said: [T]he Copyright
Act of 1831 merely enlarged the benefits of the copyright; it extended the length of the original term
and gave the author's widow and children that which theretofore they did not possess, namely, the
right of renewal to which the author would have been entitled if he had survived the original term.
The petitioners attach much significance to a sentence appearing in the report of the committee: 'The
question is, whether the author or the bookseller should receive the reward.' The meaning of this
sentence, read in its context, is quite clear. By providing that, if the author should not survive the
original term, his renewal interest should, instead of falling into the public domain, pass to his widow
and children, Congress was of course preferring the author to the bookseller. But neither expressly nor
impliedly did the Act of 1831 impose any restraints upon the right of the author himself to assign his
contingent interest in the renewal. That the Act contained no such limitation was accepted without
question by both the courts . . . and by the commentators . . . . Representative Ellsworth, who sub-
mitted the committee report on the bill that became the Copyrigh Act of 1831, himself stated un-
equivocally that an agreement to assign the renewal was binding upon the author.
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corded early opinions. Prior to the advent of the terrible trio, there
were few instances in which a work, be it musical composition or
literary endeavor, had the requisite durability necessitating protec-
tion beyond the original term. Then as now, the public taste for
such "popular works" was exceedingly fickle. As a result, sufficient
pecuniary reasons for litigation were generally lacking.
The dawn of the twentieth century saw abrupt reversal of this
calm and the courts found themselves assailed with cases bearing
upon renewal and survivorship matters. The hapless judges found
themselves ill-equipped in a statutory sense to deal with a problem
that was primarily statutory in nature. Few cases of record were
present for them to apply the revered doctrine of stare decisis. In
such circumstances all that could logically be hoped for was a liberal
application of the doctrine of common sense on the part of the
courts. Whether such hope was in fact fulfilled is a matter for con-
jecture.
The first major case for consideration in this field of copyright
was that of Wheaton v. Peters.7 Henry Wheaton was the author of
twelve books of reported cases argued before the Supreme Court of
the United States. He had sold his rights in the volumes to a pub-
lisher. Upon the expiration of the first term of copyright, a trans-
feree of the rights of the original publisher, acting as agent for the
author, renewed the copyright. In so doing, he failed to deposit the
required copies with the Library of Congress.
After expiration of the first term, the defendants published a
series of court reports in which Wheaton's first volume appeared
verbatim. The lower court dismissed the action upon defendant's
contention that there had been no infringment since there had not
been complete compliance with the renewal requirements. In up-
holding the lower court, the Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion
that even if there had not been proper compliance with the statutes,
there still existed a common law copyright. The Court indicated
that,
From the authorities cited in the opinion of the court, and
others referred to, the law appears to be well settled in Eng-
land that, since the Statute of 8 Anne, the literary property
of an author in his works can only be asserted under the
statute....
That an author at common law has a property in his man-
uscript, and may obtain redress against anyone who de-
prives him of it, or by obtaining a copy endeavors to realize
a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted but this is a
very different right from that which asserts a perpetual
and exclusive property in the future publication of the
work, after the author shall have published it to the world.
That a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor must
be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statu-
tory provision, under the rules of property which regulate
society, and which define the rights of things in general."
It will thus be seen at the outset, that the Court recognized that the
granting of protection in the form of a limited monopoly (in time)
7 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), rev'd., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 725 (1834).
8 Id. at 591 (Emphasis added).
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was an artificial concession and therefore not to be granted any aid
without the four corners of applicable statutes. This basic premise
will be seen to pervade the thinking of the courts today.
Such an attitude on the part of the courts stems, in large meas-
ure, from the old common law concept that anything which was
such a product of mental labors was incorporeal in nature and in-
capable of possessing any right inherent in the ownership of tangi-
ble property. This thought persists even today in that our current
copyright cases deem an idea per se as not capable of copyright.9
A consideration of the last link in the basic statutory chain of
copyright legislation to date bearing upon renewal rights is now in
order. The pressures of the vague and insubstantial financial posi-
tion in which authors were placed eventually came to be known to
persons in positions of authority in the national government. Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to Congress in 1905, indi-
cated:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are im-
perfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expres-
sion; they omit provision for many articles which, under
modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection;
they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which
are not essential to the fair protection of the public; they
are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for
the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the
public. Attempts to improve them by amendment have
been frequent, no less than 12 acts for the'purpose have
been passed since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by
further amendment seems impracticable. A complete revi-
sion of them is essential .... 10
The House Committee Report which accompanied the House
Bill number 28192 (later to be known as the Copyright Act of 1909)
to the Congress in February 1909, indicated that the legislators had
been thinking in terms of lengthening and strengthening the hold
which an author and the natural objects of his bounty could exert
upon the fruits of his labors." The committee also manifested an
intention to create a new procession of persons, in addition to the
author, who could succeed to the renewal rights if the author had
9 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
10 H.Doc. 1, 59th Cong., 1st Sets., pp. LII (1905).
11 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 14-15 (1909), "Section 23 deals with the term of
the copyright. Under existing law the copyright term is twenty-eight years, with the right of renewal
by the out or, or by the author's widow or children if he be dead, for a further term of fourteen years.
The Act of 1790 provided for an original term of fourteen years, with the right of renewal for fourteen
years. The Act of 1831 extended the term to its present length. It was urged before the committee that
it would be better to have a single term without any right of renewal, and a term of life and fifty
years was suggested. Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the
advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author
sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a
great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be
the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the
existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.
The present term of twenty.eight years, with the right of renewal for fourteen years, in many
cases is insufficient. The terms, taken together, ought to be long enough to give the author the
exclusive right to his work for such a period that there would be no probability of its being taken
away from him in his old age when, perhaps, he needs it most. A very small percentage of the copy-
rights ore ever renewed. All use of them ceases in most cases long before the expiration of twenty-
eight years. In the comparatively few cases where the work survives the original term the author
ought to be given on adequate renewal term In the exceptional case of a brilliant work of literature,
art, or musical composition it continues to have value for a long period, but this value is dependent
upon the merit of the composition. Just in proportion as the composition is meritorious and deserving
will it continue to be profitable, provided the copyright is extended so long; and it is believed that
in all such cases where the merit is very high this term is certainly not too long."
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died.1 2  The committee not only formulated the groups to accede to
the privilege but additionally ranked them in descending order of
priority. To this latter provision and its wording, we owe many of
the current cases in the field of copyright litigation.
With the adoption of this extensive revision of the copyright
law of the United States in 1909, we reach the point where we must
turn away from the formulation of the statutes themselves. A
scrutiny of the application given these words by the various courts
of the United States follows.
Basically, our copyright law remains the same structure today
as that adopted in 1909. True, here and there a word or phrase has
been deleted.'1  The Copyright Act has been codified.14  Nonethe-
less, the structure and philosophy of the act remain intact. This
may serve to strengthen the validity of a survey of the cases arising
thereunder from the act's adoption to the present.
There have been attempts in Congress over the course of the
intervening years to interpose another general revision of the copy-
right statutes.'; Up to the present day, they have come to naught;
the act remains essentially intact.
II. AUTHORS, NATURAL AND UNNATURAL OBJECTS OF THEIR BOUNTY
The privileges of copyright are completely statutory in nature
and thus only those persons other than the author as enumerated
by the statute are entitled to the renewal term of a copyright."
Early cases took the view that any prior assignment of renewal
12 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 14-15 (1909), "Your committee do not favor and
the bill does not provide for any extension of the original term of twenty-eight years, but it does
provide for an extension of the renewal term from fourteen years to twenty-eight years; and it makes
some change in existing law as to those who may apply for the renewal. Instead of confining the
right to renew to the author, if still living, or to the widow or children of the author, if he be dead,
we provide that the author of such work, if still living, may apply for the renewal, or the widow,
widower, or children of such author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower,
at, children be not living, then to the author's executors, or, in absence of a will, his next of kin.
Itiwas not the intention to permit the administrator to apply for the renewal, but to permit the author
who had no wife or children to bequeath by will the right to apply for the renewal."
13 Copyright Act of 1909, § 23. the words "when such contribution has been separately registered".
which appeared in the second proviso after the words "composite work", were deleted by Copyright
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 51.
14 Made into positive low by the Copyright Act of 1947, ch. 391 § 1, 61 Stat. 652, which provided
in part that, "Title 17 of the United States Code entitled 'Copyrights' is codified and enacted into
positive law and may be cited as 'Title 17, U.S.C. §
15 Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents (General Revision of the Copyright Low), 72nd
Cong., 1st Sess., (1932) 547 pps.; Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on H.R. 10976 a
Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Acts respecting Copyright and to Codify and Amend Common-law
Rights of Authors in their Works, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1932) 229 pps.; Hearings Before the House
Committee on Patents for Revision of Copyright Laws, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1936) 1560 pps.
16 Black v. Henry G. Allen Co., 56 Fed. 764 (S.D. N.Y. Cir. 1893); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Gaff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911); Southern Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang, 10 F. Supp. 975, (S.D. N.Y.
1935); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 27 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
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rights on the part, of the author was of purely contractual flavor
and should be upheld as against any of the enumerated survivors
of the author.17 More recent cases have completely abandoned such
a view, unless the author himself be in fact alive at the commence-
ment of the renewal period. 8
Should the author survive until the commencement of the re-
newal period, a prior valid assignment of his renewal expectancy
can serve to compel him to take out a renewal application. Fur-
ther, a trust will be impressed upon him to hold such renewal right
to the benefit of the assignee.'
In speaking' further on the validity of assignments of renewal
rights by authors, the Court through the medium of the Witmark
case said:
As stated in the report of the House Committee, this bill
'differs in many respects from any of the bills previously
introduced.' Your committee believes that in all its essen-
tial features it fairly meets and solves the difficult problems
with which the committee had to deal.
The report cannot be tortured, by reading it without re-
gard to the circumstances in which it was written, into an
expression of a legislative purpose to nullify agreements by
authors to assign their renewal interests. If Congress,
speaking through its responsible members, had any inten-
tion of altering what theretofore had not been questioned,
namely, that there were no statutory restraints upon the
assignment by authors or their renewal rights, it is almost
certain that such purpose would have been manifested ...
We agree with the court below, therefore, that neither
the language nor the history of the Copyright Act of 1909,
lend support to the conclusion that the 'existing law' prior
to 1909, under which authors were free to assign their re-
newal rights if they were so disposed, was intended to be
altered .... 20
It seems clear that the Court will tolerate no attempt to hedge
legally where a properly constituted agreement to assign the re-
newal right exists and the author remains alive when the expect-
ancy ripens into reality.
2 1
An examination of the status of a renewal right assignment by
the author when death intervenes reveals differing results. Since
17 Paige v. Banks, 13 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1871). A court reporter contracted with a publisher to
supply him with said reports and publisher was to have "copyright of said reports to them and their
heirs and assigns forever." The Court indicated that the agreement was intended contractually to pass
all the interest of the author in the work and therefore the publisher had become absolute owner, to
the derogation of the author or his survivors.
IS Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 274 F. 731 (E.D. N.Y. 1921), off'd., 279 Fed. 1018 (2d Cir. 1922),
rev'd. 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Southern Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo-Lang, 10 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. N.Y. 1935);
G. Ricordi & Co. v Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 42d Cir. 1951).
19 M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), off'd., 125 F.2d
949 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd., Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). In 318 U.S. 643,
649, the Court said, "We conclude, therefore, that the Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify agree-
ments by authors to assign their interests. We are fortified in this conclusion by reference to the actuaf
practices of authors and publishers with respect to assignments of renewals, as disclosed by the records
of the Copyright Office....
"The available evidence indicates, therefore, that renewal interests of authors have been regarded
as assignable both before and after the Copyright Act of 1909. To hold at this late date that, as a
matter of low, such interests are not assignable would be to subiect all relevant aids to construction.'"
20 Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 648 (1943).
21 Witmark & Sons v. Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 950 (1942). There the court said, in upholding
the lower court decision, "It is to be conceded by all concerned that this creates only an expectancy,
and that in any event the author must be alive on the first day of the twenty-eighth year in order to.
obtain a renewal. An assignment of this expectancy must rest also an survival."
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the major aim of that provision of the act dealing with survivor-
ship is to protect the author and those dependent upon him for a
means of support, the statute will exclude the enforcement of a re-
newal assignment executed in futuro by the author where the
death of the author has interposed. 22 The basic reasoning behind
this result as effectuated by the statute is evidenced by the report
which accompanied the Act of 1909 to the floor of the House.23 It is
probable that the thinking of the legislators was not as black as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter characterized the contentions of a defense
counsel when he said, "The policy of the copyright law, we are told,
is to protect the author-if need be, from himself-and a construc-
tion under which the author is powerless to assign his renewal in-
terest furthers this policy. We are asked to recognize that authors
are congenitally irresponsible. ' '24 The fact remains that society
places great emphasis upon a finished product of literary or musical
composition with little regard for the well-being of the author either
before or after the masterpiece is consumated. Possibly this view
is fostered by the popular though fallacious picture of a starving
and disease-ridden composer emerging from his stuffy garret with
his masterpiece in hand. Only from the hands of such a man, so the
myth continues, can come true inspiration and art. It is submitted
that this is far from the concept likely to "Promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts."
The scheme of statutory renewal right represents a marked de-
parture from the well-settled common law theories of descent and
distribution. In truth, the term "renewal right" is a misnomer since
the courts have construed this right to be a new power and not
stemming from and attached to the original copyright term.25 The
renewal then, does in fact, constitute a new thing of value quite
separate from the original registration and available only to the
named individuals or classes set forth within the confines of the
statutory provisions.
26
The law sets out the following order in which the enumerated
persons or classes may gain the right to renewal application and
possession of the renewal term when issued thereunder:
1. The author;
2. The widow, widower, or children (if the author is dead);
3. The author's executor (if none of the persons named in
subsection 2 survive);
4. If the author died intestate and is not survived by per-
son or persons in subsection 2, then to next of kin.
2 7
Within these four enumerated categories lie the seeds of innumer-
able litigations. These provisions have been damned for their gen-
22 Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Carmichael v. Mills Music,
121 F. Supp. 43 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
23 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
24 Whitmork and Sons v. Fisher Music Co., 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
25 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, (S.D. N.Y. 1957); off'd., 265 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1959); cert. gr., 361 U.S. 809 (1959); aff'd., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960); Witmark & Sons v.
Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), aff'd., 125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942); aff'd., Fisher
Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S 643 (1943); Silverman v Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909,
(1921).
26 Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F.
Supp. 314, 315 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) "... and that the plaintiff made application for renewal within one
year before the initial term expired. This being the case, it is clear that the plaintiff acquired a new
and independent right in the copyright, free and clear of any rights, interest, or licenses attached to
the copyright for the initial term."
27 Copyright Act, 17 U.5C., § 24 (1958).
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erality, for their lack of specifically defined inter-relationships be-
tween the categories, and for their ability to confuse the wary and
unwary alike. Yet they remain the tools of the trade. The only way
to ascertain the extent of their efficacy has been to try them in a
court of law. To the cases then we must turn in an attempted move-
ment to glean the full significance of the statutes.
III. THE DEATH OF AN AUTHOR
Presuming the demise of an author or composer prior to the
commencement of the twenty-eighth year of the original copyright
term, it seems clear by both the legislative intent and the exact
words of the statute that the "Widow, widower, or children" sur-
viving will be entitled to the first right to renew.
One question arising under this first segment of Section 24 was
whether the word "or" was meant in a disjunctive or conjunctive
sense. Does a widow take in preference to any surviving children?
Addressing itself to this important question in the 1956 case of De-
Sylva v. Ballentine,8 the Court through Mr. Justice Harlan said,
Two questions are involved: (1) do the widow and chil-
dren take as a class, or in order of enumeration, and (2) if
they take as a class, does 'children' include an illegitimate
child? Strangely enough, these questions have never be-
fore been decided, although the statutory provision in-
volved have been part of the Act in their present form since
1870.29
In examining the first proposition, the Court indicated that the
words "Widow, widower, or children" were unintentional substi-
tutes of the word "or" for the word "and" between the time of the
1831 Act and the 1870 revision. The Court said,
There is no legislative history, either when the 1870 Act
was passed or in the subsequent sessions of Congress, to in-
dicate that Congress in fact intended to change in this re-
spect the existing scheme of distribution of the renewal
rights. Rather, what scant material there is indicates that
no substantial changes in the act were intended. It would
not seem unlikely that the framers of the 1870 statute, in-
terested in compressing the somewhat cumbersome phras-
ing of the prior Copyright Act, simply deleted the words
'and child' with the thought that the remaining phrase 'or
children' expressed precisely the same result, leaving un-
affected the rights of the author's children which had been
the same for almost forty years.30
It would, therefore, seem settled under the present act that the
widow and children are to take renewal rights as a class.
What do the courts hold to be a "child" within the meaning of
the act? Holding that the brand of illegitimacy would only serve as
a bar upon application of state law, the Court indicated that there
28 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956).
29 Id. at 572.
30 Id. at 576.
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is no law of domestic relations on a federal level.31 Reference to the
law of the forum state is therefore in order.
How long does a widow continue to retain her status as such?
The only case of record to date passing upon this question has in-
dicated that within the four corners of the copyright statute, the
woman will continue in this status indefinitely, subsequent mar-
riages notwithstanding. 32 Whether a widower would likewise re-
main so classified upon remarriage is subject to conjecture.
Presupposing the non-survivorship of the widow, widower, or
children, what is the position of the executor named in a will? May
he exert his powers under the statute to preclude a contractual ob-
ligation made by the author? In Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles3 3 the
Court faced this problem squarely. The question: presented there
was whether the author of a set of copyrighted poems, who:had as-
signed all of his interest including authority to renew to a pub-
lishing house, could, by will at the time of his decease, transfer to
his executor or legatee under the will the capacity to obtain the re-
newal right under the statute in derogation of his contract.
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Holmes, indicated an affirmative answer to the question. The
Court specifically said, in regard to the status of the executor, that,
[W] e see no sufficient reason for thus limiting the right
of the executor. The section read as a whole would express
to the ordinary reader a general intent to secure the con-
tinuance of the copyright after the author's death, and none
the less so if the actual continuance was effected by creat-
ing a new estate, or if the beneficiaries in certain cases are
pointed out. No one doubts that if Carleton had died leav-
ing a widow she could have applied as the executor did, and
executors are mentioned alongside of the widow with no
suggestion in the statute that when executors are the prop-
er persons, if anyone, to make the claim, they cannot make
it whenever a widow might have made it. The next of kin
come after the executors. Surely they again have the same
rights as the widow would have had. The limitation is de-
rived from a theory that the statute cannot have intended
the executor to take unless he took what the testator al-
ready had. We should not have derived that notion from
the section, which seems to us to have the broad intent we
expressed .
34
In placing the executor on a par with the other classes designated
31 DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956), the Court said, "We come then, to the question
.of whether an illegitimate child is included within the term 'children' as used in section 24.
"The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its
content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal low. . . .This is especially true where a
:statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
primarily a matter of state concern. . . To decide who is the widow or widower of a deceased
author, or who are his executors or next of kin, requires a reference to the low of the State which
created those legal relationships. The word 'children' although it to some extent describes a purely
physical relationship, also describes a legal status not unlike the others. To determine whether a childhas been legally adopted, fdr example, requires a reference to state law. We think it proper therefore,
to draw on the readymade body 
of state law to define the word 
'children' n section 24."
32 Marks Music Carp. v. Borst Music Pub. C0 ., 110 P. Supp. 913 (D.C. N.J. 1953), at 917, "Defendants
contend further that as Davis' wife remarried she lost her widow's rights to a renewal copyright.
No such restriction is expressed or implied in the wordin of the Act nor does any recorded case underthe A t lend support the theory. Authority to the efect that a woman who remarries 
retains her
:status as widow of her first husband abounds in analogous branches of law ..... "
33 261 U.S. 326 (1923).34 Id. at page 329.
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in the statute, the Court has cleared up a question hitherto unan-
swered, possibly at the cost of raising a strong doubt in the mind of
any publisher seeking to retain control over a work of literary en-
deavor or a musical composition.
The most recent case in which the Court undertook to review
the position held by an executor in relation to an assignee-publisher
came in April, 1960.35 Involving litigation over the renewal rights
to a well-known song titled, innocuously enough, "Moonlight and
Roses", the case is possessed of an intriguing fact situation meriting
discussion. The gist of it is as follows.
The Miller Corporation had gained control of the original copy-
right term through a predecesor firm. The original copyright was
gained in January of 1925. In 1946, Ben Black, who, in collabora-
tion with Charles N. Daniels, had written the words and music, as-
signed his partial interest in a copyright renewal to the plaintiff
Miller. Later that year, plaintiff, seeking to protect himself from
any rights of survivors, obtained separate assignments from the
three brothers of Black of any respective interests which they might
have in the renewal term. In 1950, Ben Black died before the com-
mencement of the last year of the original term. He left no wife
nor children. He did, however, die testate, naming his brother Da-
vid as executor. The residuary estate was left to Black's nieces and
nephews.
In 1952, during the last year of the original term, the executor
applied for and was granted a renewal. The California Superior
Court issued a decree ordering distribution of the estate proceeds.
The nieces and nephews took the song rights and assigned them to
Charles Daniels, the co-author.
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts granting to the
executor the right to renewal privileges, Mr. Justice Douglas speak-
ing for a slim majority of the Court said,
We fail to see the difference in this statutory scheme be-
tween widows, widowers, children, or next of kin on the
one hand and executors on the other .... True, these are
disparate interests. Yet Congress saw fit to treat them
alike. It seems clear to us, for example, that by the force
of § 24, if Black had died intestate, his next of kin would
take as against the assignee of the renewal right. Congress
in its wisdom expressed a preference for that group against
35 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960).
Expert * Commercial Printing
Brief Printers * Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books - Magazines
* Books - Book BindingTHE en H use Ogn
* HueOrgans
2400 CURTIS STREET
AM 6-3277 PRESS Denver, Colorado
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
the world, if the author, the widow, the widower, or children
are not living. By § 24 his executors are placed in the same
preferred position, unless we refashion § 24 to suit other
policy considerations. Of course an executor usually takes
in a representative capacity. He 'represents the person of
his testator' . . . and that normally means that when the
testator has made contracts, the executor takes cum onere.
• ..It is clear that under this Act the executor's right to
renew is independent of the author's rights at the time of
his death. What Congress has done by § 24 is to create con-
tingent renewal rights .... [WI hether it works at times an
injustice is a matter for the Congress, not for us.3 6
The Court has. thus clearly indicated that although injustice
may result, the statute must govern. It would seem that the point
has been reached where the publisher requires some legislative pro-
tection from the operations of such a train of events. Surely the
public good requires the well-being of all facets of the industry, be
they authors, composers, or publishers.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, accorded to by three of his
fellow justices, showed strong dissatisfaction with the majority's
application of Section 24. Indicating that distinctions should be
drawn in the case of executors, the opinion went on to say,
The important question, then, is to determine the extent
to which Congress has seen fit 'to depart from the ordinary
rules of succession.' In reaching its conclusion, the Court
has, I think, overlooked critical distinctions between differ-
ent clauses of the statute.
.o .I agree that the provision for a 'compulsory bequest'
to the author's widow and children should be held to bar
effective assignment of renewal rights against them.
But I cannot perceive of the applicability of this reason-
ing to the executor .... Surely we cannot infer jegislative
concern over the protection of the interest of whomsoever,
of the large indeterminate class of potential legatees, should
prove in fact to be chosen by the author.
3 7
The dissent concludes by saying, "By undermining the sales value
of renewal rights at the expense of the author and his immediate
family this decision impinges on the very interests which the Copy-
right Act was designed to protect." 3
What of the position of the administrator c.t.a? The legislative
intent of the Congress seemed to have precluded an administrator
from applying for renewal rights. 39 The majority of the reported
cases have taken the position that it matters not whether the ad-
ministrator be d.b.n. or c.t.a.40 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
follow a line of reasoning which would prevent the garnering of
renewal rights under the statute merely because of the death of an
executor, but this is what has happened. The only result is the en-
try into the public domain, at a premature date, of valuable rights
36 Id. at 795-96.
37 Id. at 797.
•38 Id. at 798.
39 Surra at note 11.
40 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911); Danks v. Gorden, 272 Fed. 821
(2nd Cir. 1921); Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 804 (2nd Cir. 1923); cert. den. 262 U.S.
758 (1923).
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for the lack of some intermediary figure capable of obtaining the
right for a deserving legatee.
A comparatively recent case 41 shows a possible departure from
this strict application of sanction against any type of administrator.
The fact situation is striking since it involves litigation by a sister
of an author to prevent an administrator c.t.a. from gaining access
to the renewal rights for the author's various books. The named
beneficiary by the terms of the deceased's will was his home town
of Gibran, Lebanon. In upholding the decision of the lower court
that the administrator c.t.a. was capable of gaining the renewal
right for the legatee town, Judge Hand of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals indicated that such adminstrator did, in fact, stand in
the shoes of an unnamed executor for the will. 42 He further indi-
cated that the prior holding of this same circuit court of appeals in
the Sunrise cases43 regarding an administrator c.t.a.d.b.n. was mere-
ly dicta and therefore not binding upon the court.
The view expressed by these courts in the Gibran decision is
likely to be lent added authority in view of the denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. It would seem then that the position of such
an administrator c.t.a. will henceforth allow him to exercise such
powers with regard to copyright renewals as would be held by an
executor.
According to statute, the author's next of kin are only entitled
to renewal rights in the absence of a will. 44 This being true, little
more than a vague hope accrues to one in this category in the pres-
ence of a will. In the face of the latest decision granting an admin-
istrator c.t.a. the same power of renewal as the executor, it would
appear well near impossible for a next of kin to gain access to the
right when a will-is extant.
Should a will not be in existence and none of the higher ranked
persons named by the statute survive, the door is opened for the
next of kin to apply for renewal. Since he has been termed to be a
member of a class, he holds the right in trust for whatever mem-
bers of the next of kin that may come to the fore at a later date. 45
Under the circumstances, the renewal privilege gained by one of
such status is probably the most uncertain of all. Its pecuniary re-
wards would remain in doubt for a substantial period of time. Any
other members of the group would be fully as capable of assigning
his rights to another publisher.46 Under the circumstances, the
value of such a right might be appreciably diminished.
The status of a proprietor under Section 24 indicates one pos-
sible means that can be adopted by a publisher to cope with possible
interference with his right to continue publication during the re-
newal period. If an author or composer is placed on the proprietor's
payroll, all works accomplished while on such a condition of em-
41 Gibran v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 854, off'd. 255 F.2d 121, cert. den. 358 U.S. 828 (1957).
42 Gibron v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 255 F.2d 121 (1957).
43 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (2nd Cir. 1921); Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures
Corp., 290 Fed. 804 (2nd Cir. 1923), cert. den. 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
44 Copyright Law 17, U.S.C., § 24 (1958). See. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361
(S.D. N.Y. 1938), concerning the ability of a next of kin to gain a valid renewal after the dismissal
of the executor. It is to be doubted that this view is any longer valid in the light of the decision
rendered in Gibran v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 358 U.S. 828 (1957).'
45 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909, cert. den., 262 U.S. 758 (1923); Silverman v.
Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 805, cert. den., 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
46 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
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ployment will accrue to the copyright control of the employer. Since
in this regard the employer of such an author is denominated the
proprieter of the work, the right to the renewal term as well as the
original term will belong to him.47 For the purposes of this section
of the act, the word "proprietor" may be equated with the word
"author" since all of the rights that we have heretofore identified
with the author will also accrue to a bona fide proprietor in the
author's stead.
Cases illustrative of this principle are not lacking on the rec-
ords.48 The results remain the same whether an artist paints a
mural for a high school under contract to the board of education49
or a song-smith\ turns out tunes for a music publisher on a weekly
retainer. 50
IV. JOINT WORKS, COMPOSITE WORKS- THEIR EFFECT ON RENEWALS
A joint work can best be described as the combined work pro-
duct of two or more persons which, once completed and fitted to-
gether, remains from then on incapable of being identified except
as a unified whole.51 This is in contradistinction to a composite
work, which is merely the conglomeration of several independent
works placed in company with one another merely for the purpose
of a single venture. An example of the latter would be an antho-
logy of western novels.
In the case of a true joint composition, it matters not that the
collaborators were unaware of the other's activities at the time of
the work, had never had personal meetings with their co-worker, or
indeed, were at all aware of his existence.52 Here, mere intention
of the parties governs and if a musical composer had intended that
someone supply his composition with words, a joint work will ensue
upon the application of the words to music,54 The ramifications of
a joint work in the field of renewal copyright privileges is more
widespread than the simplicity with which they may be formed
would tend to indicate.
The troubles start with the onset of the renewal period, espe-
cially if one or more of the joint owners has died in the meantime.
Rival publishing companies find themselves ranged on the opposite
sides of a courtroom, one possessing what he thought to be an ef-
fective assignment from the surviving author while the opposing
publisher pins his hopes upon the assignment of the widow or child
of the deceased co-author. From such chaos only dissatisfaction can
ensue regardless of what solution the court indicates.54 If two valid
renewals are deemed to have been made, one of the lyrics and the
other of the music, during the renewal period we have the anomal-
47 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 24 (1958).
48 Von Tilzer v. Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191, off'd. Cumm v. Vogel Music Co.. 158 F.2d 516
(2d Cir. 1944); Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 36 F. Supp. 544, aff'd. 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941).
49 Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361, aff'd. 108 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1939). The lower
court said, at page 364, "When a man, hereinafter referred to as a patron, contracts with an artist
to paint a picture for him, of whatever nature it may be, the contract is essentially a service contract,
and when the picture has been painted and delivered to the patron and paid for by him, the artist
has no right whatever left in it."
50 Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57, cert. den., 305 U.S. 650 (1939).
51 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
52 Marks Music Corp. v. Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
53 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, cert. den., 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
54 Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960); Norden v. Oliver Ditson
Co., 13 F. Suop. 415 (D.C. Mass. 1936); Maurel v. Smith, 220 Fed. 195 (S.D. N.Y. 1915), aff'd.,
271 Fed. 211 (Id Cir. 1921).
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ous result of an indivisible work that has been strangulated by di-
vision. Clearly, a result unhappy in its effect.
The major source of confusion in regard to composite works is
in the area of the extent of protection granted to the individual
component parts. The section of the act dealing with such works
indicates that, "The copyright provided by this title shall protect all
copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all
matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without
extending the duration or scope of such copyright. '55 It is to be
noted that in dealing with the copyright of composite works the
thing sought to be protected is not the individual compositions in
themselves, but rather the format. Keeping such an approach in
mind, it seems only logical that the compiler of the collection should
apply for renewal rights in his own name as "author" as well as
making application for the original term. Such is indeed the case.56
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What conclusions may we draw from the cases considered? It
would be simple enough to say that the statutory provisions of the
present Copyright Act need radical revision. The confusion sown
by the vague framing of Section 24 is evident from the cases enum-
erated. The most recent cases reported indicate that future litiga-
tion in this field of renewal rights and survivors' benefits will only
be limited by the fertile minds of copyright attorneys.
Indeed, copyright law in the United States is confronted with an
anomalous situation. The basic premise is that copyright law in the
United States is primarily and fundamentally a creature of statute.
The long lines of litigants moving constantly through our crowded
court seeking clarification by adjudication is no tribute to the fram-
ers of present day laws of copyright.
The entire purpose for the creation and maintenance of this
form of limited monopoly called copyright is ostensibly to foster
the public good by giving added incentive to would-be creators of
such works. If this purpose is to be adequately fulfilled, a firm
foundation for future reliance must be laid down in the form of con-
trolling statutes. That such statutory certainty does not exist today
55 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 3 (1958).
56 Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 1 F. Supp. 713, (D.C. Ga. 1932).
Y v BUSINESS CARDS
MANUSCRIPT COVERS I0 FOR $IO
CLIP YOM LEERUAD TO F RIS AD..












2329 Glenarm Place, Denver 5, Colo.
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
is evident from a survey of the cases. Hence the first conclusion is
that we must replace our present provisions of the Copyright Act
dealing with renewal rights and survivors' benefits.
Since the field of copyright control is completely statutory in
concept and form, logic would indicate that this artificial animal
must be nutured and cared for from within the bosom of a statutory
system dealing in specifics. When and under what circumstances
may an author assign his renewal rights? When do such rights cease
to be an expectancy and become a vested interest? When does the
renewal right vest in the enumerated classes of preferred individ-
uals? These are but some of the flood of questions that should have
been answered by the statutes but ended in the courts due to the
yawning imperfections of the statutory provisions. Therefore our
second conclusion is that any replacement statute must be drawn
with particularity and addressed specifically to the problems likely
to be encountered.
Must the United State's concept of renewal rights be preserved
in any future statutes or is it preferable to adopt some scheme of
copyright protection more nearly in line with those of the majority
of other nations in- the world? The proclaimed purpose of such re-
newal rights provisions has been two-fold: firstly, to protect the au-
thor from his own improvident business affairs; secondly, to pro-
tect his family at the time of his demise. It may well be asked if we
cannot protect effectively these enumerated classes of individuals
in another and simpler way. That other nations of the world utilize
such systems is evident from an examination of the world copyright
scene. Hence, the third conclusion is that we must abandon our
present scheme of renewal rights and substitute a simpler and more
workable device. In attempting to formulate such a device, this
country should strive to find a replacement which will more nearly
conform to our own concepts of descent and distribution and move
more to the direction of the prevailing theories of world copyright
protection.
How shall we accomplish such a radical departure from the old
and, in this country, established pattern of copyright renewals, inef-
fectual assignments of renewal expectancies and supposedly vested
renewal rights? Let us venture forth and attempt to rough out the
possible form of a replacement statutory provision for Section 24.
I. The duration of the copyright term is declared to be deter-
mined by the length of the author's life plus a span of fifty
years from the date of his death.
II. Should the author die possessed of his copyright, it shall de-
volve in the following manner:
A-to the author's widow or widower and children then
living,
B-upon the death of all persons of Class "A", prior to or
simultaneous with the author's death, then the profits
derived from such copyright to the objects of the au-
thor's bounty as determined by the provisions of the
author's will, if there be a will in existence. If there be
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no will, the profits shall accrue to those persons de-
termined by the local laws governing descent and dis-
tribution.
C-Executors and administrators are to deal with the copy-
right for the benefit of those persons or things as de-
termined to be in class "B".
III. Any person or group may purchase complete copyrights from
the author during his lifetime and thereby attain full and
lasting control thereof, PROVIDED THAT,
A-during the author's lifetime periodic arbitration may be
had upon demand of the author at the end of each five
year term dating from the execution of the original as-
signment of rights by the author. (Note-details of such
arbitration are left out for the purpose of clarity of ex-
position.)
B-the right to such arbitration may not be waived except
by a writing executed by the author during the fifth
year of each arbitration period in question.
IV. Upon the death of an author, his successors in interest shall
have the same right to make full, complete and lasting as-
signment of copyright privilieges EXCEPT that only mem-
bers of Class "A" shall be privileged to invoke the provisions
for periodic arbitration as to questions of readjustment of pay-
ments.
V. All joint ownership is hereby abolished in copyright matters.
In its stead, the joint collaborators shall designate one of their
number to be holder of the legal copyright. Such a holder
shall be deemed to hold said right in trust for his collabora-
tors. Upon such holder's decease or mental incapacity, the
rights shall devolve to another member of the original group.
The proportionate share of the deceased's equitable interest
shall be dispensed in accordance with section II.
This skelatal form of a proposed replacement statute is far
from flawless but it does serve to illustrate the fundamental thesis
of this paper. Since the entire field of copyright law is statutory
and artificial, let us make the most of it. Instead of finding our-
selves chained to an obsolete piece of artificiality, let us cast it out
and find a new scheme more in line with current thinking in the
world. If we can make these copyright provisions work for the pub-
lic good once more instead of simply contributing to the public con-
fusion, we shall have recaptured our congressionally fabricated







FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
- ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
The defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance'
which prohibited the distribution of any handbill that did not indi-
cate on its face the name and address of the author and identity of
the individual sponsoring its distribution. The purpose of the hand-
bill was to urge a boycott against certain merchants who would not
offer equal employment opportunities to persons of various races,
and to solicit membership in a consumer organization to fight this
evil. The defendant urged that the ordinance violated his free-
dom of speech and press. The Superior Court of Los Angeles af-
firmed the conviction 2 and the United States Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari. 3 The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was un-
constitutional as an abridgment of freedom of speech and press se-
cured against state invasion by the fourteenth amendment. Talley
v. California, 80 Sup. Ct. 536 (1960).
Freedom to communicate for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 It is commonplace
that the printed or spoken word may not be the subject of prior
restraint or subsequent punishment unless it creates a substantial
manifested or anticipated evil that the state has power to prevent. 5
The policy toward restrictive "handbill" legislation" has been
set forth in numerous Supreme Court decisions. An ordinance for-
bidding any distribution of circulars, handbills or literature of any
kind within a city limit without the permission of the city manager
is an unlawful abridgment of freedom of the press.7 So also are
ordinances which forbid, without exception, any distribution of
handbills on the streets,8 even where this distribution involves a
trespass upon private property in a company-owned town9 or in a
government-owned housing development.10 Religious sects may not
be obstructed under a broad statute from exercising the privilege of
1 Los Angeles, Calif. Municipal Code § 28.06 (1932), which reads: "No person shall distribute any
handbill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or face
thereof, the name and address of the following: (a) the person who printed, wrote, compiled or
manufactured the same, (b) the person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however,
that in the case of a fictitious p.rson or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and
addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsorina said handbill shell also apear
thereon." See Denver, Colorado. Revised Municipal Code '1 352.13 (1951) (Distribution of Handbills).
2 332 P.2d 447 (Cal. App. 19581.
3 360 U.S. 928 (1959).
4 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (The First amend-
ment is secured against state infringement by the fourteenth). See also Corwin, The Constitution and
What it Means Today, 252 (11th ed. 1954).
5 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (compelling interest of the state). But see Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (emphasis placed upon serious danger); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941). Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (opinion by Holmes, J.).
6 The "Handbill" cases, infra notes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. See also the list of preferred position cases
identified by Frankfurter in his opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336' U.S. 77 (1949).
7 Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. (1943); Schneider v. Irvington,.'308 U:S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
8 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
9 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
10 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
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door-to-door distribution" or solicitation,12  though door-to-door
peddling and distribution of purely commercial advertising matter
could be lawfully restrained.'3 In Schneider v. Irvington,14 efforts
were made to distinguish four broad restrictive ordinances from
those previously struck down, on the grounds of prevention of
frauds, disorder and littering within the city limits. 5 In refusing
to uphold the' ordnances, the Court pointed out that there were
other means available to accomplish these aims without abridging
personal freedom of communication. 6
The broad ordinance in the instant case falls squarely within
the ban of the previous "handbill" cases and is declared void be-
cause of unlimited restriction of distribution. 17 The ordinance did
not restrict what could be said, who could say it, or where it could
be said. The only condition to free distribution of the matter was
the identity of the publisher and distributor which created the pos-
sibility that someone might hesitate to publish if he must identify
himself with his own statements.
The Court had before it, in resolving the familiar problem of
individual freedom versus state police power," the question of
whether the freedom to communicate also contains the freedom to
communicate anonymously.
The Supreme Court has at least three times considered the
"right to remain anonymous."' 9 While the Court has mentioned
the guaranty of freedom of speech in the course of its opinions, the
decisions have rested primarily upon the constitutional right of free-
dom of association..0 the anonymity in these cases pertaining to
privacy within a group. The earliest case, Bryant v. Zimmerman, '
upheld a New York statute which required secret organizations
such as the Ku Klux Klan to file membership rosters with the
state.2 2 Two more recent decisions, NAACP v. Alabama23 and Bates
v. City of Little Rock 24 (both completely opposite from Zimmer-
man) held that a state may not compel members of a lawful group
engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified. The
Court reasoned that identification and fear of reprisal might deter
perfectly peaceful discussions of public importance. 25
11 Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
12 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
13 Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
14 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
15 Schneider v. Irvington, 38 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinances from Milwaukee, Wisc.; Worchester,
Mass.; Los Anqeles, Calif. and Irvington, N.J. were tried together on the basis of unlimited restriction
of distribution).
16 Schneider v. Irvington, supra note 14 at 162.
17 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1S Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945) (the court recognized the frequency with which
this problem arises and the delicacy of its solution).
19 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 80 Sup. Ct. 412 (1960) (disclosure of membership lists would
interefere with members' freedom of speech and association); NAACP v. Alamoba, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (NAACP not required to divulge membership); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954) rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (statute compelling the
Communist party to submit membership lists . . . clear and present danger); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953) (concurrinq opinion, lists of puurchosers should not be required to be divulged);
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (statute requirinq disclosure of membership lists valid).
20 American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (opinion suggested identification
as members of a grouup could have coercive effects on constitutional rights).
21 Bryant v. Zmmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); State Control Over Political Organization, 66 Yale
L.J. 545 (1957).
22 The Court construed that the statute exempted labor unions and benevolent associations as
beneficial, but the potentialities of evil secret societies to render harm brought them necessarily
within state control.
'3 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
24 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 80 Sup. Ct. 412 (1960).
25 Bates v. City of Little Rock, supra note 24 at 416. See also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (the government remains responsible to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected).
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The distinguishing feature of this group of cases appears to be
that the degree of privilege is contingent upon the nature of the
group, the Ku Klux Klan being more of a threat to peaceful societal
existence than the other group.- '
Justice Black, a known crusader of human liberty,'2 7 in writing
the majority opinion in the instant case, decided that the right of
anonymous communication exists, but he has not limited the extent
of that right. Surely the Court does not propose to announce a new
absolute, namely, that even those groups which have no freedom
to speak, or those types of speech which are not privileged can now
be uttered anonymously. Since all justices agree, despite the first
amendment, that freedom of speech is not absolute, the question be-
comes one of deciding what and when speech is not protected by the
amendments.-' There is no clear cut rule to determine this nor
should there be any mechanical device to dispense justice in such
cases. 29  Viewed in the light of past decisions, the court must be
merely clarifying that which has been in existence since the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights-where one is free to speak he is also free
to speak anonymously.:' The effect of the instant holding will re-
main to be seen in future cases where government regulated com-
munication arises."
Dissenting Justice Clark, joined by two others,'2 sought to limit
the "handbill" doctrine to its present bounds by assertng that the
Constitution says nothing about freedom of anonymous speech. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court itself has upheld an act of Congress re-
quiring any newspaper using second class mail to publish the names
of the editor, owner and stockholders.:' It has upheld the Federal
Lobbying Act"14 requiring those engaged in direct lobbying activities
to divulge their identities. Statutes in a majority of states prohibit
the distribution of anonymous publications that refer to political
candidates." Similarly, the Supreme Court has held constitutional
city ordinances which prohibit the distribution of leaflets and door-
to-door canvassing for purely commercial purposes, the use of sound
trucks being operated on the city streets using instruments to emit
26 Judge Swain, Los Angeles Superior Court, concurring in the instant case: "The distinction between
the two seems to be that the members of the NAACP are good guys and the members of the Ku Klux
Klan are wicked men," 332 P.2d at 452 (Cal. App. 1958). See clso United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 at 57 (1953) the Court did not consider the constitutional question but the concurring opinion, and
said, "Once the government can demand of a publisher the names of the purchasers of his publica-
tions, the free press as we know it disappears."
27 Justices Black and Douglas, and perhaps Chief Justice Warren, 'are known as the libertarian
element of the Supreme Court, Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment, 196 (1957).
28 Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 392 (1950).
29 The line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which will be legitimately
regulated, suppressed and punished is finely drawn, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Corwin,
Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 Notre Dame Low. 325 (1952) (the status of the danger
rule is subject to doubt). American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ("clear and
present danger" is not a mechanical test in every case touching the first amendment).
30 Anonymous writings are for from uncommon in American tradition. See Bleyer, Main Currents
in the History of American Journalism 56-57, 79-82, 102 (1927).
31 See generally Mehler, Constitutional Free Speech v. State Police Power, 33 DICTA 145 (1956).
32 Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker join dissenting. Justice Frankfuruter is part of the well-known
liberalist element of the Supreme Court, Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment 197 (1957).
33 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
34 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1952); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (but the statute is
narrowly construed).
35 Thirty-six states have statutes prohibiting anonymous distribution of materials relating to
elections; see Colo. Rev. Star. 1 49-21-39 (1957), which states, "Whoever willfully publishes or
distributes any card, pamphlet, circular, poster, dodger, advertisement or other writing relating to or
concerning any person who has publically declared his intention to seek election . . . which does not
contain the names of the persons, associations Ietc. I ... responsible for the publication or distribution
of the same . . . shall . . . be fined . . . (no Colorado decisions). See also Kan. G. S. § 25-1714
(1949), held constitutional in State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936).
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"loud and raucous noises, '36 and publications containing fraudulent,
deceitful, libelous words that cause injury.3 7 Ordinances prohibit-
ing obscene statements38 and false advertising" also have been sus-
tained. It was said that Talley's handbill designed to injure a busi-
nessman was no more comportable with the first amendment than
these. The city was merely acting in the public welfare.
The cases cited on both sides can clearly be distinguished. Each
of the "handbill" cases involved a broad ordinance proscribing dis-
tribution of all handbills or leaflets, not limiting the matter to
that of a commercial or possibly injurious content. The restriction
by broad sweep also silenced individuals or groups seeking to fur-
ther an idea by distribution of material solely devoted to informa-
tion or public protest."
Those cases which upheld seemingly more restrictive ordi-
nances than in the Talley case, dealt with specific legislation with-
in the power of the state to control. The legislation was pointed at
a particular type of communication leaving little doubt of the evil
or prospective evil sought to be prevented.4 1 Clearly, the Talley
case should not be included with this group unless those dissenting
are ready to acknowledge that all speech is to be state regulated.
The purpose of the ordinance provision in the instant case is
fairly obvious; it was to make it easy for the city or any individual
injured by a publication to place the blame on a particular individ-
ual.42 It is suggested that the prohibition of Talley's anonymous
publication in no way restricts his freedom of expression, but mere-
ly imposes on the advocate the responsibility necessarily associated
with a well-ordered society,43 the theory being that we should have
nothing to hide from one another. 44
This view overlooks or disregards the long history behind the
basic constitutional freedoms45-the fact that free discussion of the
problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism 46 and
that the validity of our civil and political institutions depends upon
such discussion. Accordingly, a function of free speech and free
press under our system of government is to invite dispute. "Its
highest purposes are sometimes served when a condition of unrest
creates a dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs
people to anger. '47 It was this sort of speech that the Bill of Rights
was designed to protect. Those utterances of a purely orthodox na-
ture need no protection.
With this in mind, justification for the "right to remain anony-
mous" becomes apparent. Few would rigorously assert beliefs if
36 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
37 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Jersey, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
38 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
39 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (a state may regulate commercial advertising in
the public interest).
40 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41 United States v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the regulation measure must be
narrowly drawn to meet the evil that the government can control.
42 People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 453 (Cal. App. 1958).
43 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), 291 ("Ordered Liberty," Jackson, J. dissenting);
State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936).
44 We still believe in a secret ballot; some of the most worthwhile literature in American history
was written under a pen name. Bleyer, Main Currents in the History of American Journalism, 56-57,
79-82, 102 (1927).
45 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 813-23 (1931). See generally Douglas, We the Judges 307-28
(1956); See also S Encyc. Soc. Sci. 455-59.
46 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
47 Termuriello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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life and lives of family members would be endangered thereby, or if
ill will and hostility of the community would be the inevitable re-
sult.
48
It may be urged that if the individual is not required to reveal
himself when he speaks and does not accept the responsbility for
what he says, the community will not be able to protect itself from
injurious frauds, libels and obscenity that would result.49 The aims
of the Los Angeles ordinance may have indeed been worthy ones,
but the fact that the liberties may be abused by a miscreant few
does not make any less the necessity of immunity of the individual
from previous restraint.0 It must be remembered that the Bill of
Rights was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that
too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement
of the law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free
society should not be sacrificed.
Richard W. Laugesen.
BAR BRIEFS
REPORT OF LEGAL FEE REVIEW COMMITTEE
TO THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Gentlemen:
The Colorado Bar Association, at its 1959 annual meeting, auth-
orized the creation of a Legal Fee Review Committee, to serve the
public, clients and attorneys, in the adjustment of controversies
concerning legal fees, without resort to the costly, protracted and
drastic remedies previously available. That Committee has been
organized recently and is now in functioning order.
The services of the Committee are available to all clients of all
lawyers actively engaged in practice in Colorado, whether members
of the Association or not and to the lawyers themselves.
The Committee is composed of one member of the Colorado Bar
Association from each judicial district in Colorado appointed by the
President of the Association. To insure continuity, one-third of the
Committee serves for one year, one-third for two years, and one-
third for three years. It meets as determined by the Committee or
upon call of the Chairman, who is appointed for a period of one
year by the President of the Association.
The Committee functions in the following manner. A complaint
in a controversy over legal fees is filed by either the client or the
attorney with the Colorado Bar Association. The Secretary immedi-
ately notifies both parties that the matter will be held in abeyance
for 30 days to allow the parties an opportunity to settle their differ-
ences. Upon notice by either party that the controversy has not
been settled within the 30-day period, it is then referred to the Com-
48 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 453 (Cal. App.
1958) (dissenting opinion).
49 The state contended that the ordinance was aimed at prevention of "fraud, deceit, false adver.
tising, negligent use of words, obscenity and libel," 80 Sup. Ct. 536, 539 (1960).
50 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
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mittee for action, not however, until both parties have executed a
brief Referral Agreement, in which it is agreed that the matter be
referred to the Committee for investigation and final and conclusive
determination, that the parties will assist the Committee in every
manner in its investigation, and that they will abide by the determ-
ination of the Committee.
The Chairman of the Committee then appoints an investigating
committee of three members who are selected from a panel of all
members of the Colorado Bar Association residing in the appropri-
ate judicial districts. To better insure fair and impartial judgment,
if client and attorney reside, or client resides and attorney has an
office in the same judicial district, the investigating committee is
selected from the panel of that judicial district. If the attorney's of-
fice is in one judicial district, and the client resides in another, one
member of the committee is chosen from each such judicial district,
and the third member from another judicial district. There are
similar provisions in the event the client is a corporation or is a non-
resident of the state.
The investigating committee examines the parties to the con-
troversy, interviews witnesses and makes such other investigation
as it. deems appropriate. When the investigation has been conclud-
ed, the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Com-
mittee are forwarded to the Chairman of the Legal Fee Review
Committee. This Committee reviews the action of the Investigating
Committee and makes a written determination and decision as to
whether the fee complained of should be approved or disapproved
and decreased. Further hearings before the Committee may be had
if deemed advisable. The determination of the Committee may in-
clude a finding that a greater fee would have been justified, and a
finding as to the amount of a proper fee. Such two last mentioned
findings are not mandatory and are not binding on the parties. The
final decision of the Committee is submitted to the Secretary of the
Colorado Bar Association, who forwards copies to the parties to the
controversy, and to the Chairman of the Investigating Committee,
and as stated, the decision is binding upon the parties to the con-
troversy.
The Committee may decline to accept jurisdiction, or may sur-
render the same, if it becomes apparent that there is no just ground
for complaint or dispute, that the matter is moot, or if for any other
reason deemed adequate, jurisdiction is, or becomes unwarranted.
In reaching decisions, the Committee and the Investigating
Committee may consider appropriate minimum fee schedules and
all other pertinent factors, and shall consider all related matters in
the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association. The Com-
mittee shall be guided by the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, but shall not be bound thereby.
All matters in connection with each controversy are to be held
in confidence by the members of the Committees and the officers of
the Colorado Bar Association, so far as is reasonably possible.
Respectfully submitted,
HENRY S. SHERMAN, Chairman
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RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE LAWYERS' FIDELITY
FUND COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO BAR
ASSOCIATION
I. STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
The purposes of the Lawyers' Fidelity Fund are:
A. To furnish a means of protecting the reputation of lawyers
in general from the consequences of dishonest acts of a very few.
B. To furnish a means of reimbursement to clients for financial
losses occasioned by dishonest acts of lawyers:
(1) To the extent that the Fund is capable of making re-
imbursement; and
(2) If in the opinion of the Committee the client is entitled
to reimbursement.
In establishing the Lawyers' Fidelity Fund the Colo--
rado Bar Association did not create, nor acknowledge,
any legal responsibility for the acts of individual lawyers
in their practice of law. Therefore, all reimbursements
of losses by the Lawyers' Fidelity Fund shall be made
solely at the discretion of the Committee and not as a
matter of legal right capable of enforcement by any
claimant.
II. RULES OF PROCEDURE
Definitions
For the purpose of these rules of procedure, the following defi-
nitions shall apply:
(1) The "Committee" shall mean the Lawyers' Fidelity Fund
Committee.
(2) The "Fund" shall mean the Lawyers' Fidelity Fund.
(3) "Lawyers" shall include only those lawyers admitted to
practice law within the State of Colorado, domiciled and
actively practicing law within said State.
(4) "Reimbursable Losses" shall include only those losses of
money or other property of clients of lawyers which meet
the following tests:
(a) That the loss shall have been caused by the dishonest
act of a lawyer.
(b) That the lawyer shall have died, been adjudged mentally
ill, been disbarred or suspended from practice.
(c) That the dishonest act shall have been committed within
the State of Colorado, or as a part of a contract of em-
ployment, the major portion of which was to be per-
formed within said state.
The following shall be excluded from "Reimbursable Loss-
es":
(a) Losses of wives and other close relatives, partners, serv-
ants and employees of lawyers; and
(b) Losses the proof of which, either as to factual existence
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or as to amount, is dependent upon inventory computa-
tion or profit and loss computation.
(5) "Dishonest Acts" shall mean wrongful acts committed by
lawyers against clients in the manner of defalcation or em-
bezzlement of money, or the wrongful taking or conversion
of property of such clients, or the failure to remit moneys or
property when due such clients.
III. MANNER OF MAKING APPLICATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT
Applications to the Fund for reimbursement for loss suffered
by clients as the result of dishonest acts of lawyers shall be in
writing and shall be -ddlesseo Pra delivered to the Chairman of
the Committee. Said applications shall be in such form as the appli-
cant may deem suitable for presenting the facts of his case, but
shall contain the following minimum information:
A. The name of the "Lawyer."
B. The amount of the "Reimbursable Loss"; and
C. The date or period of time during which the loss was in-
curred, together with a sufficient statement of facts to show that
the loss is in fact a "Reimbursable Loss" as hereinbefore defined.
All applications shall be supported by submission of such
documentary evidence as may be available and shall be signed by
the applicant.
IV. PROCESSING AND ALLOWANCE OF APPLICATIONS
Applications submitted to the Committee shall be referred by
the Chairman to any member or members of the Colorado Bar As-
sociation for investigation and recommendations as to the validity
of the claim included in the application. Such members shall be
reimbursed for reasonqble out-of-pocket expenses incurred by them
in making such investigations.
The reports of investigation and the recommendations thus
made shall be submitted to the Committee as a whole. The Com-
mittee, during the month of December of each calendar year, in its
sole discretion shall determine the amount of loss for which any
client shall be reimbursed and in making such determination the-
Committee shall consider, inter alia, the following.
(1) The negligence, if any, of the client which contributed to the.
loss,
(2) The comparative hardship the client has suffered by the-
loss,
(3) The total amount of applications for reimbursement which
has been submitted by the clients of any one lawyer or association-
of lawyers, and
(4) The total amount of applications for reimbursement which
has been processed bv thn Committee during said calendar year,.
with due regard to the total assets of the fund, provided, however,
that no claim filed after November 31, shall be payable out of funds
available for that c-lend.?r year. but may be considered by the.
Committee during the succeeding calendar year.
(5) No reimbursement shall be made to any client unless ap-
proved by a majority of the Committee.
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V. SUBROGATION FOR REIMBURSEMENTS MADE
In the event reimbursement is made to a client, the Fund shall
be subrogated in said amount and may bring such action as it deems
advisable against the lawyer, his assets or his estate, either in the
name of the client or in the name of the Colorado Bar Association.
The client shall be required to execute a subrogation agreement in
said regard.
The client shall be entitled to bring an action for recovery of
losses directly against the lawyer, his assets or his estate if the Com-
mittee has not done so within six month of execution of the subro-
gation agreement. Any amounts recovered from the lawyer, either
by the Committee or the client, in excess of the amount to which
the fund is subrogated, less the Committee's actual costs of such
be.
VI. MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEES
The Committee shall meet from time to time upon call of the
Chairman, provided that the Chairman shall call a meeting at any
reasonable time at the request of at least two members of the
Committee.
VII. GENERAL PROVISIONS
No publicity shall be given to the rules of procedure, to applica-
tions for reimbursement, payments made by the Committee or to
,ny action of the Committee without the express prior approval of
the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association.
These rules may be changed at any time by a majority vote of
the Committee if said changes are approved by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Colorado Bar Association.
These rules have been adopted subject to the approval of the
Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association this 10th day
of September, 1960.
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